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	Provedor de dados AgEcon (8) Autor Gramig, Benjamin M. (8) Horan, Richard D. (4) Black, J. Roy (2) Skees, Jerry R. (2) Wolf, Christopher A. (2) Boehlje, Michael (1) Gray, Allan W. (1) Reeling, Carson J. (1) Roucan-Kane, Maud (1) Shogren, Jason F. (1) Mais... Palavra-chave Environmental Economics and Policy (3) Livestock Production/Industries (2) Agribusiness (1) Agricultural conservation practices (1) Animal feeding operations (1) Asymmetric information (1) Bioeconomics (1) D82 (1) DAYCENT (1) Environmental risk (1) Epidemiology (1) Externalities (1) Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety (1) G22 (1) Genetic algorithm (1) Greenhouse gases (1) Institutional and Behavioral Economics (1) Insurance (1) L51 (1) Livestock disease (1) Mais... Tipo do documento Conference Paper or Presentation (7) Journal Article (1) Ano 2011 (1) 2010 (1) 2009 (1) 2008 (1) 2006 (1) 2005 (1) 2004 (1) 2003 (1) Mais... País United States (8) Idioma Inglês (8)		Ordenar por:  Relevância Autor Título Ano Registros recuperados: 8 Primeira ... 1 ... Última Utilizing Contingent Claims to Improve the Management of CAFOs AgEcon Gramig, Benjamin M.; Skees, Jerry R.; Black, J. Roy. We propose a market-based approach to reducing the environmental risk posed by concentrated animal feeding operations (CAFOs). The dual problems of hidden information and hidden action faced by policymakers are considered alongside the competing incentives faced by the CAFO manager in a multiple principal-agent setting. A new approach that uses insurance-like contracts is introduced by use of the specific example of a swine operation with a lagoon-based manure management system. Index-based contingent claims contracts in tandem with third-party auditing and waste hauling options are introduced as a complement to regulatory frameworks designed to reduce negative externalities from production. Tipo: Journal Article Palavras-chave: Animal feeding operations; Asymmetric information; Environmental risk; Insurance; Public policy; Regulation; D82; G22; L51; Q18; Q25; Q28. Ano: 2004 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/43346 CONSIDERING MARKET-BASED ALTERNATIVES TO IMPROVE THE MANAGEMENT OF CAFOs AgEcon Skees, Jerry R.; Black, J. Roy; Gramig, Benjamin M.. This paper presents a proposal to utilize insurance as a market-based alternative to traditional command-and-control regulation of concentrated animal feeding operations in order to meet policy goals to curtail negative environmental externalities. Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy; Livestock Production/Industries. Ano: 2003 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/22248 Jointly-Determined Livestock Disease Dynamics and Decentralized Economic Behavior AgEcon Gramig, Benjamin M.; Horan, Richard D.. We develop a dynamic model of livestock disease and decentralized economic behavior as a jointly-determined system. By accounting for feedbacks between behavioral choices and disease outcomes we capture the endogenous nature of infection risks. We consider government mandated testing of livestock herds and how private biosecurity incentives are affected by the structure of disease eradication polices. How well disease control policies are targeted affects their effectiveness and may result in farmers substituting government testing and disease surveillance for private biosecurity. Numerical simulation results demonstrate that failing to account for feedbacks between disease and economic dynamics may underestimate the level of infection. Not accounting for... Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Bioeconomics; Epidemiology; Replicator dynamics; Externalities; Strategic behavior; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy. Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/49260 Livestock Disease Indemnity Design When Moral Hazard is Followed by Adverse Selection AgEcon Gramig, Benjamin M.; Horan, Richard D.; Wolf, Christopher A.. Averting or limiting the outbreak of infectious disease in domestic livestock herds is an economic and potential human health issue that involves both the government and individual livestock producers. Producers have private information about preventive biosecurity measures they adopt on their farms prior to outbreak (ex ante moral hazard), and following outbreak they possess private information about whether or not their herd is infected (ex post adverse selection). We investigate how indemnity payments can be designed to provide incentives to producers to invest in biosecurity and report infection to the government, while simultaneously addressing the information asymmetry between producers and the government. We show how addressing the adverse selection... Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety; Livestock Production/Industries; Risk and Uncertainty. Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/6542 Wildlife Conservation Payments to Address Habitat Fragmentation and Disease Risks AgEcon Horan, Richard D.; Shogren, Jason F.; Gramig, Benjamin M.. We build a stylized model to gain insights into the application of conservation payments to protect endangered species in the face of wildlife-livestock disease risks and habitat fragmentation. Greater connectivity of habitat creates an endogenous trade-off. More connectedness ups the chance that populations of endangered species will grow more rapidly; however, greater connectivity also increases the likelihood that diseases will spread more quickly. We analyze subsidies for both habitat connectedness and livestock vaccination. We find the cost-effective policy is to initially subsidize habitat connectivity rather than vaccinations; this increases habitat contiguousness, which eventually also increases disease risks. Once habitat is sufficiently... Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy. Ano: 2006 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/21076 A Model of Incentive Compatibility under Moral Hazard in Livestock Disease Outbreak Response AgEcon Gramig, Benjamin M.; Horan, Richard D.; Wolf, Christopher A.. This paper uses a principal-agent model to examine incentive compatibility in the presence of information asymmetry between the government and individual producers. Prior models of livestock disease have not incorporated information asymmetry between livestock managers and social planners. By incorporating the asymmetry, we investigate the role of incentives in producer behavior that influences the duration and magnitude of a disease epidemic. Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Livestock disease; Moral hazard; Principal-agent model; Institutional and Behavioral Economics. Ano: 2005 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/19200 The Innovation Process: Practices in Food and Agribusiness Companies AgEcon Roucan-Kane, Maud; Gray, Allan W.; Gramig, Benjamin M.; Boehlje, Michael. Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Agribusiness. Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/61385 Using Carbon Offsets to Fund Agricultural Conservation Practices in a Working-Lands Setting AgEcon Reeling, Carson J.; Gramig, Benjamin M.. The nitrogen cascade concept indicates that agriculture serves as a significant link between emissions of the potent greenhouse gas (GHG) nitrous oxide and losses of nitrate-N to surface waters. Conservation practices have the potential to exploit this link, as their implementation is found to reduce fluxes of GHGs and nonpoint source (NPS) water pollution. Several studies have recognized this link and have documented the potential to improve environmental quality through the use of programs which retire land, the cost of which can be offset by the sale of carbon credits. However, the ability to use land for both agricultural production and environmental conservation is important. As such, this study provides a novel analytical framework that is used... Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Greenhouse gases; Nonpoint source pollution; Agricultural conservation practices; DAYCENT; SWAT; Genetic algorithm; Environmental Economics and Policy. Ano: 2011 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/103577 Registros recuperados: 8 Primeira ... 1 ... Última

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