Data/hora: 12/06/2024 15:22:04

Provedor de dados: 	31	
País: 	United States	
Título: 	Environmental Mechanism Designs in a New Order of Regulatory Capitalism	
Autores: 	Mullen,   Jeffrey D.; Centner,   Terence J.; Wetzstein,   Michael E.	
Data: 	2007-07-02	
Ano: 	2007	
Palavras-chave: 	Command and control; Environmental education; Environmental policy; Voluntary agreements; Environmental Economics and Policy.	
Resumo: 	Complexity of environmental programs is most apparent with information asymmetries, making the design of efficient mechanisms particularly challenging.  As developed theoretically in this paper, a new regulatory capitalism paradigm mating voluntary agreements with environmental education can produce outcomes at least as efficient as voluntary agreements alone.  Such a design exploits a key difference between voluntary agreements versus educational programs in terms of their impact on agents' incentive compatibilities.  Specifically, in a principal-agent model, voluntary agreements are associated with an incentive-compatibility constraint, whereas educational programs are not.  The efficient bundle will likely consist of a set of education programs and voluntary agreements.  With the new order of regulatory capitalism, it is time to concentrate on removing barriers yielding inefficient mono-mechanism design and start constructing multidimensional incentives to efficiently allocate effort toward environmental and economic goals.	
Tipo: 	Conference Paper or Presentation	
Idioma: 	Inglês	
Identificador: 	26020

http://purl.umn.edu/9357	
Editor: 	AgEcon Search	
Relação: 	American Agricultural Economics Association&gt;2007 Annual Meeting, July 29-August 1, 2007, Portland, Oregon

Selected Paper #171391	
Formato: 	29

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