Data/hora: 11/06/2024 12:24:09

Provedor de dados: 	31	
País: 	United States	
Título: 	GALE-SHAPLEY MATCHING IN AN EVOLUTIONARY TRADE NETWORK GAME	
Autores: 	Tesfatsion,   Leigh.	
Data: 	1998-05-28	
Ano: 	1998	
Palavras-chave: 	Evolutionary game; Gale-Shapley matching; Iterated prisoners' dilemma; Trade networks; Endogenous interactions; Agent-based computational economics; International Relations/Trade; C7; C8; C9; D8; D4.	
Resumo: 	For a postscript copy of this paper, click &lt;a href="/Data/isu/er43.ps"&gt; here. &lt;/A&gt;  This study investigates the performance of Gale-Shapley matching in an evolutionary market context.  Computational experimental findings are reported for an evolutionary match-and-play trade network game in which resource-constrained traders repeatedly choose and refuse trade partners in accordance with Gale-Shapley matching, participate in risky trades modelled as two-person prisoner's dilemma games, and evolve their trade behavior over time.  Particular attention is focused on correlations between ex ante market structure and the formation of trade networks, and between trade network formation and the types of trade behavior and social welfare outcomes that these trade networks support.	
Tipo: 	Working or Discussion Paper	
Idioma: 	Inglês	
Identificador: 	782

http://purl.umn.edu/18200	
Editor: 	AgEcon Search	
Relação: 	Iowa State University&gt;Department of Economics&gt;Economic Reports

Economic Report 43	
Formato: 	40

application/pdf