Data/hora: 13/06/2024 04:26:56

Provedor de dados: 	31	
País: 	United States	
Título: 	Social Preferences and Voting: An Exploration Using a Novel Preference Revealing Mechanism	
Autores: 	Messer,   Kent D.; Poe,   Gregory L.; Rondeau,   Daniel; Schulze,   William D.; Vossler,   Christian A.	
Data: 	2008-07-18	
Ano: 	2008	
Palavras-chave: 	Institutional and Behavioral Economics; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; C91; C92; D64; D72; H41.	
Resumo: 	Public referenda are frequently used to determine the provision of public goods. As public programs have distributional consequences, a compelling question is what role if any social preferences have on voting behavior. This paper explores this issue using laboratory experiments wherein voting outcomes lead to a known distribution of net benefits across participants. Preferences are elicited using a novel Random Price Voting Mechanism (RPVM), which is a more parsimonious mechanism than dichotomous choice referenda, but gives consistent results. Results suggest that social preferences, in particular a social efficiency motive, lead to economically meaningful deviations from self-interested voting choices and increase the likelihood that welfare-enhancing programs are implemented.	
Tipo: 	Working or Discussion Paper	
Idioma: 	Inglês	
Identificador: 	http://purl.umn.edu/51132	
Relação: 	Cornell University&gt;Department of Applied Economics and Management&gt;Working Papers

Working Paper

WP 2008-12	
Formato: 	41