Data/hora: 11/06/2024 08:56:07

Provedor de dados: 	31	
País: 	United States	
Título: 	A Model of Incentive Compatibility under Moral Hazard in Livestock Disease Outbreak Response	
Autores: 	Gramig,   Benjamin M.; Horan,   Richard D.; Wolf,   Christopher A.	
Data: 	2005-05-17	
Ano: 	2005	
Palavras-chave: 	Livestock disease; Moral hazard; Principal-agent model; Institutional and Behavioral Economics.	
Resumo: 	This paper uses a principal-agent model to examine incentive compatibility in the presence of information asymmetry between the government and individual producers. Prior models of livestock disease have not incorporated information asymmetry between livestock managers and social planners. By incorporating the asymmetry, we investigate the role of incentives in producer behavior that influences the duration and magnitude of a disease epidemic.	
Tipo: 	Conference Paper or Presentation	
Idioma: 	Inglês	
Identificador: 	16446

http://purl.umn.edu/19200	
Editor: 	AgEcon Search	
Relação: 	American Agricultural Economics Association&gt;2005 Annual meeting, July 24-27, Providence, RI

Selected Paper 133432	
Formato: 	21

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