Data/hora: 11/06/2024 00:39:08

Provedor de dados: 	31	
País: 	United States	
Título: 	Nonpoint Source Pollution Taxes and Excessive Tax Burden	
Autores: 	Karp,   Larry S.	
Data: 	2006-02-02	
Ano: 	1998	
Palavras-chave: 	Ambient tax; Nonpoint source pollution; Moral hazard; Asymmetric information; Differential games; Environmental Economics and Policy; D82; H20; H40; Q20.	
Resumo: 	If a regulator is unable to measure firms' individual emissions, an ambient tax can be used to achieve the socially desired level of pollution. With this tax, each firm pays a unit tax on aggregate emissions. In order for the tax to be effective, firms must recognize that their decisions affect aggregate emissions. When firms behave strategically with respect to the tax-setting regulator, under plausible circumstances their tax burden is lower under an ambient tax, relative to the tax which charges firms on the basis of individual emissions. Firms may prefer the case where the regulator is unable to observe individual firm emissions, even if this asymmetric information causes the regulator to tax each firm on the basis of aggregate emissions.	
Tipo: 	Working or Discussion Paper	
Idioma: 	Inglês	
Identificador: 	19736

http://purl.umn.edu/25100	
Editor: 	AgEcon Search	
Relação: 	University of California, Berkeley&gt;Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics&gt;CUDARE Working Papers

CUDARE Working Paper 835	
Formato: 	34

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