Data/hora: 11/06/2024 04:29:46

Provedor de dados: | 31
País: | United States
Título: | TRADE POLICY AND TIME CONSISTENCY IN AN OLIGOPSONISTIC WORLD MARKET
Autores: | Gervais,   Jean-Philippe; Lapan,   Harvey E.
Data: | 1999-05-06
Ano: | 1998
Palavras-chave: | Precommitment; Time consistency; Optimal tariff and quota; Oligopsony; International Relations/Trade; F13; Q17; D4.
Resumo: | This paper investigates the strategic behavior between countries that have purchasing power on the world market for a certain good.  Tariffs and quotas are not equivalent protection instruments in this oligopsonistic market.  Policy active importers would be better off by colluding and setting their trade instrument cooperatively.  In a non-cooperative setting, if production decisions occur before consumption decisions, the ex-ante optimal policy is not time consistent because the ex-post elasticity of the residual foreign export supply curve is lower than the ex-ante elasticity.  However, we show that the importers' inability to irrevocably commit to their trade instrument may be welfare superior to the precommitment solution.  The negative welfare implication of non-cooperative behavior may be balanced off by the welfare effect of the ex-port elasticity.  A numerical example is proposed to provide insights on the theoretical results.
Tipo: | Working or Discussion Paper
Idioma: | Inglês

Identificador:

1271

http://purl.umn.edu/18239

Editor: | AgEcon Search

Relação:

Iowa State University&gt;Department of Economics&gt;Staff Papers

Staff Paper 310

Formato:

30

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