Data/hora: 13/06/2024 10:01:39

Provedor de dados: 	31	
País: 	United States	
Título: 	Should we combine incentive payments and tendering for efficiently purchasing conservation services from landholders?	
Autores: 	Schilizzi,   Steven; Breustedt,   Gunnar; Latacz-Lohmann,   Uwe.	
Data: 	2010-03-11	
Ano: 	2010	
Palavras-chave: 	Conservation tenders; Auctions; Incentive contracts; Agricultural policy; Environmental policy; Market-based instruments; Experimental economics; Agricultural and Food Policy; Environmental Economics and Policy.	
Resumo: 	Policy makers aiming to get private landholders to provide non-marketed environmental services need to provide efficient economic incentives. Two ideas have been explored to achieve this: linking contract payments to environmental outcomes and putting the contracts up for tender. This paper investigates whether there are any gains to be had by combining the benefits of both approaches. Landholder risk aversion may offset incentive effects if the fall in participation outweighs any increases in individual effort. Using controlled lab experiments in two countries and across four subject groups, and systematically varying the rate at which payments are linked to uncertain outcomes, this paper clarifies the conditions under which incentives overcome risk-aversion – a parameter which was also measured. Results show that for risk averse landholders the most efficient approach is in general to tender contracts only moderately linked to environmental outcomes – that is, using a balanced combination of fixed input payments and of payments linked to uncertain outcomes. This paper also highlights how experiments can complement the inherent limitations of a purely theoretical analysis.	
Tipo: 	Conference Paper or Presentation	
Idioma: 	Inglês	
Identificador: 	http://purl.umn.edu/59159	
Relação: 	Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society&gt;2010 Conference (54th), February 10-12, 2010, Adelaide, Australia	
Formato: 	33