| Registro completo |
| Provedor de dados: |
AgEcon
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| País: |
United States
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| Título: |
Can a Preferential Trade Agreement Benefit Neighbor Countries without Compensating Them?
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| Autores: |
Endoh, Masahiro
Hamada, Koichi
Shimomura, Koji
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| Data: |
2008-05-06
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| Ano: |
2008
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| Palavras-chave: |
PTA
Neighbor’s Welfare
Kemp-Wan Theorem
WTO
GATT Article 24
Entrepot
International Relations/Trade
F11
F13
F15
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| Resumo: |
PTAs are generally negotiated without any tariff concessions or transfers to non-member countries. Can such a PTA benefit the neighbors’ welfare? In a two-good competitive equilibrium model in the absence of an entrepot, a PTA without concessions to the outsider will hurt the outsider’s welfare when goods are normal. If one of the member countries is an entrepot, however, it definitely improves the neighbors’ welfare. In a multiple-good model, a PTA without concessions deteriorates the neighbors’ welfare, provided that all the goods are normal and substitutes, and that initial tariff levels are small.
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| Tipo: |
Working or Discussion Paper
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| Idioma: |
Inglês
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| Identificador: |
29551
http://purl.umn.edu/6334
|
| Relação: |
Yale University>Economic Growth Center>Center Discussion Papers
Economic Growth Center Discussion Paper
No. 961
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| Formato: |
30
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