| Registro completo |
| Provedor de dados: |
AgEcon
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| País: |
United States
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| Título: |
Conservation Auctions and Compliance: Theory and Evidence from Laboratory Experiments
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| Autores: |
Kawasaki, Kentaro
Fujie, Takeshi
Koito, Kentaro
Inoue, Norikazu
Sasaki, Hiroki
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| Data: |
2010-05-01
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| Ano: |
2010
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| Palavras-chave: |
Auctions
Conservation contracting
Compliance
Environmental Economics and Policy
C91
D44
Q24
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| Resumo: |
Poster prepared for presentation at the Agricultural & Applied Economics Association 2010 AAEA,CAES, & WAEA Joint Annual Meeting, Denver, Colorado, July 25-27, 2010.
A number of agri-environmental conservation policies are faced with the problem of imperfect monitoring. This provides farmers an incentive for noncompliance, in which they receive subsidies without implementing the conservation scheme. In this article, bidding behaviors and auction performances are compared for discriminatory-price (DP) and uniform-price (UP) auction in an imperfect monitoring environment. Our laboratory experiments show that although DP has certain advantages in terms of reducing policy costs, UP results in a superior overall performance when compliance behavior is taken into account.
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| Tipo: |
Conference Paper or Presentation
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| Idioma: |
Inglês
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| Identificador: |
10697
http://purl.umn.edu/61188
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| Relação: |
Agricultural and Applied Economics Association>2010 Annual Meeting, July 25-27, 2010, Denver, Colorado
Selected Poster
10697
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| Formato: |
2
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