Consulta: subjectFacets:"Political economy"
Registros recuperados: 49
Data/hora: 11/06/2024 08:49:10

Who Benefits from Quality Labelling? Segregation Costs, International Trade and Producer Outcomes
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Jackson,   Lee Ann.
This paper analyses the impact of quality based labelling on product prices, factor allocation and the resulting effects on producers within the context of an international trading system. A general equilibrium model, calibrated to 1998 data, describes United States and European Union labelling regimes for genetically modified agricultural products. The results indicate that the labelling choice of trade partners have large distributive impacts within national economies, as well as across countries and highlight the importance of using general equilibrium framework to understand the system wide impacts of labelling policies that differentiate products based upon quality characteristics. These results are essential for policy makers seeking to understand...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation
Palavras-chave: Labelling; International trade; Political economy; General equilibrium; Biotechnology.; International Relations/Trade; Marketing; Political Economy.
Ano: 2003
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/57897

WHO DETERMINES FARM PROGRAMS? AGRIBUSINESS AND THE MAKING OF FARM POLICY
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Alston,   Julian M.; Carter,   Colin A.; Wohlgenant,   Michael K.
Political-economic analyses of the causes and consequences of agricultural commodity policies typically emphasize farmer and consumer (taxpayer) interests and underplay the role of agribusiness. A more complete understanding of agricultural policy requires paying attention to the important role of agribusiness interests. Policies that benefit farmers (e.g., price supports, supply controls, deficiency payments) may either enhance or reduce agribusiness profits. The type of policy instrument preferred by agribusiness varies among commodities, depending on the technology of the marketing processes beyond the farm gate and the elasticity of final demand. This paper emphasizes the idea that instruments of farm policy are chosen in response to pressures from...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Farm programs; Farm policy; Agribusiness; Political economy; Agricultural and Food Policy.
Ano: 1989
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/51252

RELEVANCE OF POLICY ANALYSIS: NEEDS FOR DESIGN, IMPLEMENTATION AND PACKAGING
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Skees,   Jerry R.
This article challenges the traditional model of the economist as a humble technocrat who simply provides analysis given the preferences of policy decision-makers.  Since decision-makers rarely reveal their preferences, it is important that the would-be policy research/analyst know the political economy and be willing to identify potential performance goals for society.  Researchers who are willing to incur the transaction cost associated with becoming involved in useful policy research must learn to work within the imperfect policy process.  Policy research that considers the importance of implementation and that acknowledges the institutions and the history will have the highest chance of being useful to policy-makers.
Tipo: Journal Article
Palavras-chave: Implementation; Institutions; Policy research; Political economy; Agricultural and Food Policy.
Ano: 1994
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/15440

The Long Trace of Inequality: Evidence from Cundinamarca, Colombia
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Galan,   Juan Sebastian.
This paper uses historic data from Cundinamarca, Colombia to empirically assess the impact of land inequality persistence, inherited from the colonial rule, on economic development in the long run. Based on the Engerman &amp; Sokoloff hypothesis and the use of GIS, I use plausible exogenous variation in land endowments to design an instrumental variable strategy. In contrast to recent studies, I find that more unequal municipalities in the XIX and XX century are associated with better growth, human capital and public goods provision measures today. Political economy channels instead of agricultural productivity gains can explain these results. In municipalities where land was historically more concentrated, powerful landowners were more successful in...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Land inequality; Growth; Public goods; Political economy; Land Economics/Use; O13; D31; N36.
Ano: 2011
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/107398

Political Economy of Distortions to Agricultural Incentives: Introduction and Summary
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Anderson,   Kym.
During the 1960s and 1970s most developing countries imposed anti-agricultural policies, while many high-income countries restricted agricultural imports and subsidized their farmers. Both sets of policies inhibited economic growth and poverty alleviation in developing countries, while doing little to assist small farmers in high-income countries. Since the 1980s, however, many developing countries began to reduce the anti-agricultural bias of sectoral policies, and from the early 1990s the European Union began to move away from price supports to more-direct forms of farm income payments. This paper summarizes a forthcoming book that seeks to explain this evolving pattern of distortions to incentives conceptually and econometrically by making use of new...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Distorted incentives; Agricultural and trade policy reforms; National agricultural development; Political economy; Agricultural price and trade policies; Agricultural and Food Policy; International Relations/Trade; F13; F14; Q17; Q18; F59; H20; N50; O13.
Ano: 2009
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/50306

Pluralism and Regulatory Failure: When Should Takings Trigger Compensation?
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Boyd,   James; Brennan,   Timothy J.
The paper evaluates the desirability of compensation for regulatory takings. To do so, we describe a public choice model in which regulators' decisions are influenced by competing political interests. We consider how the political incentives of landowners, environmentalists, and taxpayers are affected by alternative compensation rules and in turn describe the regulatory decisions made in such a pluralistic political environment. Modeling the regulator's incentives in this way leads to the conclusion that compensation should not be paid unless environmentalists and property owners have unequal influence politically. Moreover, the model has several counter-intuitive implications when political influence is not balanced. For instance, if environmentalists are...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Regulatory takings; Compensation; Political economy; Environmental Economics and Policy; K11; D72; L51.
Ano: 1996
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10702

Explaining Agricultural Distortion Patterns : The Roles of Ideology, Inequality, Lobbying and Public Finance
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Dutt,   Pushan; Mitra,   Devashish.
In this paper, we examine the political economy drivers of the variation in agricultural protection, both across countries and within countries over time. The paper starts by listing the key insights provided by both the theoretical and empirical literature on the political economy of trade policy formulation. We then set out a basic framework that allows us to put forth various testable hypotheses on the variation and evolution of agricultural protection. We find that both the political ideology of the government and the degree of income inequality are important determinants of agricultural protection. Thus, both the political-support-function approach as well as the median-voter approach can be used in explaining the variation in agricultural protection...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Distorted incentives; Agricultural and trade policy reforms; National agricultural development; Agricultural protection; Political economy; Agricultural and Food Policy; International Relations/Trade; F13; F14; Q17; Q18; D72; D78; F11.
Ano: 2009
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/50299

Sensitive Product Treatment in Agricultural Trade Negotiations
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Durand-Morat,   Alvaro; Wailes,   Eric J.; Sharp,   Misti.
The fact that trade, and especially agricultural trade, remains far from free is puzzling, since the superiority of free trade receives overwhelming support among economists (Gawande and Krishna, 2003; Rodrik, 1994). International trade scholars have devoted significant resources to forecasting the impact of trade policy reforms (for a survey of these studies see Congressional Budget Office, 2005), and their findings are relevant inputs for officials negotiating a trade agreement as well as for politicians in charge of ratifying it. The perceived gains and losses attached to different outcomes have been identified as a significant factor shifting the outcome of a trade agreement negotiation (McMillan, 1990). Less well-known are the factors that would...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation
Palavras-chave: Trade negotiations; Agricultural trade; Free trade agreements; Political economy; Agricultural and Food Policy; International Relations/Trade; Political Economy; F59; Q17.
Ano: 2011
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/103835

Delay on the Path to the Endangered Species List: Do Costs and Benefits Matter?
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Ando,   Amy Whritenour.
This paper uses duration analysis to evaluate the ability of interest groups to influence the timing of decisions to add species to the endangered species list by exerting pressure on the Fish and Wildlife Service. Using data from 1990 to 1994, it finds that public opposition and support can substantially slow and hasten (respectively) the progress of candidate species through the parts of the listing process most directly under the agency's control. Since the Service is not an atypical agency, similar patterns of public influence on delay may exist in other areas of bureaucratic decision making as well.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Duration analysis; Endangered species; Political economy; Interest groups; Environmental Economics and Policy.
Ano: 1999
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10564

Food Protection for Sale
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Lopez,   Rigoberto A.; Matschke,   Xenia.
This article tests the Protection for Sale (PFS) model using detailed data from U.S. food processing industries from 1978 to 1992 under alternative import demand specifications. All empirical results support the PFS model predictions and previous empirical work qualitatively. Although welfare weights are very sensitive to import demand specification, a surprising result is that we obtain weights between 2.6 and 3.6 for domestic welfare using import slopes or elasticities derived from domestic demand and supply functions. In contrast, results based on import slopes or elasticities from directly specified import demands (including the Armington model) yield the usual, unrealistically large estimates for the domestic welfare weight. We contend that the latter...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Trade protection; Tariffs; Lobbying; Political economy; Food manufacturing; Agricultural and Food Policy; Political Economy; F13; F1; L66; C12.
Ano: 2005
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25195

Invasive Species Management Through Tariffs: Are Prevention and Protection Synonymous?
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Ranjan,   Ram.
This Paper designs a political economy model of invasive species management in order to explore the effectiveness of tariffs in mitigating the risk of invasion. The revenue interests of the government together with the interests of the lobby group competing with the imported agricultural commodity, that is believed to be the vector of invasive species, are incorporated in a Nash Bargaining game. The government, however, also considers the impact of tariffs on long run risks of invasion and decides optimal tariffs based upon its welfare in the pre and post-invasion scenarios. Along with the size of the lobby group, which is a function of the slope of the demand and supply curves, the weights assigned to the various components in the government welfare...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Invasive species; Political economy; Tariffs; Bargaining; Interest groups; Political Economy; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; H23; Q17; Q58.
Ano: 2004
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/15642

Policy Responses to 2008 High Food Prices: Domestic Incentives and Global Implications
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Woolverton,   Andrea E.; Kiawu,   James.
Global food commodity price inflation beginning in 2006 and continuing through mid-2008 became a priority concern for global consumers, producers and policy-makers alike.  In response, many governments across the world implemented policies targeting high food commodity prices in their domestic markets.  These policy responses were concentrated in lower income countries and primarily targeted rice and wheat. The 2007-08 policy responses across countries included liberalized import tariffs, export restrictions and increased domestic support for both consumers and producers.   We develop a case study of 15 major global trading, lower-income countries’ policy responses .  The analysis addressed the following questions: a) What policy responses did major global...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation
Palavras-chave: High food prices; Trade policy; Agriculture; Political economy; Agribusiness; Agricultural and Food Policy; Crop Production/Industries; International Development; International Relations/Trade; Political Economy.
Ano: 2009
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/104506

Political Economy of Agricultural Trade Interventions in Africa
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Bates,   Robert H.; Block,   Steven A.
Replaced with revised version of paper 08/25/09.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Distorted incentives; Agricultural and trade policy reforms; National agricultural development; Agriculture; Taxation; Political economy; Agricultural and Food Policy; International Relations/Trade; F13; F14; Q17; Q18; O13.
Ano: 2009
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/50302

Is Protection for Sale in U.S. Food Industries?
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Lopez,   Rigoberto A.; Hathie,   Ibrahima.
This article tests the Grossman-Helpman Protection for Sale model using panel data from U.S. food processing industries with endogenous protection, imports, and political organization of industries. The results support the key predictions of the model: organized industries are granted higher protection that decreases with import penetration and the price elasticity of imports, but in unorganized industries protection increases with import penetration. In spite of substantial differences in data sets and empirical procedures, the estimated weight on aggregate welfare is strikingly similar those found by Goldberg and Maggi (1999) and Gawande and Bandopadhyay (2000), implying that protection is not for sale in these industries. Furthermore, the presence of...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Trade protection; Tariffs; Lobbying; Political economy; Food manufacturing; Agribusiness; Agricultural and Food Policy; International Relations/Trade; Political Economy.
Ano: 2002
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25182

Economies of Scope in Endangered-Species Protection: Evidence from Interest-Group Behavior
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Ando,   Amy Whritenour.
This paper looks for positive spillovers from the legal protection of one species to the welfare of others, and for evidence of economies of scope in the costs associated with protecting species under the Endangered Species Act. The analyses use data on the intensity of interest-group comment activity in response to proposals to protect new species. The results suggest that these phenomena are significant, strengthening arguments that wildlife-protection policy should be shifted towards species groups or ecosystems. However, the findings are also consistent with diminishing public willingness-to-pay for protected species in a given area, a pattern which also has public-policy implications.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Economies of scope; Endangered species; Political economy; Interest groups; Environmental Economics and Policy.
Ano: 1999
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10903

Getting on the Map: The Political Economy of State-Level Electricity Restructuring
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Ando,   Amy Whritenour; Palmer,   Karen L.
Retail competition in electricity markets is expected to lead to more efficient electricity supply, lower electricity prices, more innovation by suppliers and a greater variety of electric power service packages. However, only a handful of states have currently gone so far as to pass legislation and/or make regulatory decisions to establish retail wheeling. This paper analyzes a variety of factors that may influence the rate at which legislators and regulators move towards establishing retail competition. In general, we find that where one interest group dominates others in the struggle for influence over the decision makers, the net effect seems to push a state forward more quickly when retail wheeling is expected to yield large efficiency gains.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Electricity restructuring; Deregulation; Political economy; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; D78; L51; L94.
Ano: 1998
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10643

Tax-Versus-Trading and Free Emission Shares as Issues for Climate Policy Design
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Pezzey,   John C.V.; Jotzo,   Frank.
We give empirical welfare results for global greenhouse gas emission control, using the first multiparty model to combine tax-versus-trading under uncertainties with revenue recycling. Including multiple parties greatly reduces the welfare advantage of an emissions tax over emissions (permit) trading in handling abatement-cost uncertainties, from that shown by existing, single-party literature. But a tax has a different, much bigger advantage, from better handling uncertainties in business-as-usual emissions. Either mechanism's free emissions share, from tax thresholds or free permits, which lowers its possible welfare gain from revenue recycling, may however dominate any tax-versus-trading advantage. Moreover, political and practical constraints, such as...
Tipo: Journal Article
Palavras-chave: Climate policy; Emission pricing; Tax vs. trading; Uncertainties; Revenue recycling; Political economy; Environmental Economics and Policy; D810; H230; Q580.
Ano: 2010
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/95049

Institutions and EU Decisions-Making: the 'Power' of the European Commission
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Pokrivcak,   Jan.
I develop a two-stage political economy model that explicitly models the complexity of decision-making in the European Union on the Common Agricultural Policy, and I derive how the institutional design affects the outcome and the influence of the various agents involved, and the likelihood of political stalemate.
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation
Palavras-chave: Political economy; European Union; Common Agricultural Policy; Voting; International Development.
Ano: 2002
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/24862

Teaching Agricultural Policy Using Games: The Agripol Game
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Jongeneel,   Roelof A.; Koning,   Niek.
We developed the AGRIPOL game as a tool for teaching agricultural policy to economic and non-economic students. AGRIPOL consists of a world with 7 different countries, each one represented by a small group of students. The students have to maximize their country's social welfare by choosing an optimal set of policy instruments. By doing this students learn in an interesting and hands-on way to understand the workings of agricultural policy instruments, the interrelatedness between countries (policy impact spill-overs) and the role of political weights in the policy formation process. A WTO negotiation round is included to let students experience the difficulties and benefits of cooperation.
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation
Palavras-chave: Economics education; Political economy; Agricultural policy; Teaching/Communication/Extension/Profession; A2; P16; Q18.
Ano: 2005
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/24773

Environmental payments in conflicting situations between nature provision and cost minimization: a political economy approach
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Nuppenau,   Ernst-August.
We will analyze a newly emerging conflict within the second pillar of the rural development policy of the EU: a conflict between those farmers, who want to participate in high nature value agriculture, and farmers, who feel negatively impacted by supporting nature provision. We see a link through competition for land between nature provision in agriculture and cost minimal production of commercial farmers. The idea is to model this conflict using a political bargain approach and make a contribution on how to solve the conflict by innovative institutional arrangements. The power of groups will be analyzed and what governments can do.
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation
Palavras-chave: Conflict; Political economy; Nature provision; Community/Rural/Urban Development.
Ano: 2010
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/95313

Political Economy of Agricultural Distortions in Transition Countries of Asia and Europe
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Rozelle,   Scott; Swinnen,   Johan F.M.
The paper analyzes the political and institutional factors which are behind the dramatic changes in distortions to agricultural incentives in the transition countries in East Asia (China and Vietnam), Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, etc), the rest of the former Soviet Union, and in Central and Eastern Europe. The paper explains why these changes have occurred and why there are large differences among transition countries in the extent and the nature of the remaining distortions.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Distorted incentives; Agricultural and trade policy reforms; National agricultural development; Political economy; Agricultural distortions; Transition economies; China; Agricultural and Food Policy; International Relations/Trade; F13; F14; Q17; Q18; N50; O13; O21; P22; P26.
Ano: 2009
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/50298

Agricultural Price Distortion and Stabilization: Stylized facts and Hypothesis Tests
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Masters,   William A.; Garcia,   Andres F.
This paper describes agricultural policy choices and tests some predictions of political economy theories. It begins with three broad stylized facts: governments tend to tax agriculture in poorer countries, and subsidize it in richer ones, tax both imports and exports more than nontradables, and tax more and subsidize less where there is more land per capita. We test a variety of political-economy explanations, finding results consistent with hypothesized effects of rural and urban constituents’ rational ignorance about small per-person effects, governance institutions’ control of rent-seeking by political leaders, governments’ revenue motive for taxation, and the role of time consistency in policy-making. We also find that larger groups obtain more...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Distorted incentives; Agricultural and trade policy reforms; National agricultural development; Agricultural price distortions; Political economy; Agricultural and Food Policy; International Relations/Trade; F13; F14; Q17; Q18; D72; D78; F11; H23.
Ano: 2009
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/50301

Evaluating rural development policy - review of the CMEF
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Huelemeyer,   Kerstin; Schiller,   Simone.
With the Common Monitoring and Evaluation Framework (CMEF) a guidance document for evaluation of rural development policy has been published by the European Commission. The CMEF defines the requirements on monitoring and evaluation and specifies a limited number of quantitative common indicators applicable to each programme. While in general the introduction of the CMEF is considered as being a helpful tool for carrying out evaluation, substantial criticism has been expressed regarding the suggested methodological approach and the provided set of impact indicators. Based on qualitative analyses, this article focuses on contributing to a better understanding of the evaluation process in order to learn from stakeholder perceptions and draw conclusions on how...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation
Palavras-chave: Evaluation; CMEF; Indicators; Political economy; Success factors; Community/Rural/Urban Development.
Ano: 2010
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/94920

Regional Integration in Developing Countries: Some Lessons Based on Case Studies
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Shams,   Rasul.
The main focus of this paper is the question if the success of regional integration organisation in developing countries is, in fact, dependent on factors like similarity of their economic structure, market size or lack of commitment. It is shown that there are also other more important institutional and politico-economical reasons to explain the functioning of such organisations in developing countries. Case studies of ECOWAS and SADC will be used to discuss this question. It is also very often argued that southsouth integration is inferior to north-south integration. This will be discussed considering the case of MERCOSUR as an example.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Regional integration; Economic development; Africa; Latin America; Political economy; International Relations/Trade; F15; O1; P16.
Ano: 2003
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/26272

How Trade Politics Affect Invasive Species Control
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Margolis,   Michael; Shogren,   Jason F.
Trade has become the main mode of transport for many invasive species including diseases and agricultural pests. Most species are brought to their new homes unintentionally, which constitute a market failure rooted in international trade. Unless it is practical to drive invasion risk to zero, the external costs may justify a tariff. In this paper we analyze the political process likely to govern the formation of tariffs so justified, using a straightforward incorporation of an invasive species externality into Grossman and Helpman's well-known political economy model. We show our measure of disguised protectionism -the gap between the optimal tariff and that set in the equilibrium of the political economy game- is equal to the tariff that would be set if...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Invasive species; Protectionism; Tariff; Political economy; Environmental Economics and Policy; Q17; Q56; Q57.
Ano: 2004
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10770

Evaluating the 1996 EU food aid reform:  Did it really lead to better targeting?
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Maas,   Sarah.
The paper analyses the 1996 EU food aid reform and addresses the question of its impact on improving EU food aid allocation in terms of reaching those countries which are most vulnerable to food insecurity. Using a two-stage regression model the analysis finds that EU food aid in kind is increasingly targeted towards developing countries affected by food insecurity. Most importantly, characteristics such as low calorie supply and balance-of-payments difficulties gained in importance in EU food aid allocation during the recent years. However, even though progress is noticeable, the results suggest a lack of coordination between the EU and other food aid donors which exacerbates food aid variability and may lower aid effectiveness.
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation
Palavras-chave: EU food aid; Policy reform; Political economy; Two-stage model; Agricultural and Food Policy; Food Security and Poverty; International Development; Political Economy; O13; Q18; Q19.
Ano: 2009
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/51618

Reflections
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Ranis,   Gustav.
This paper examines the causes of Taiwan's exceptional economic performance, focusing on the influence of organizational and policy choices and how Taiwan's example differs from those of more typical less-developed countries. After briefly citing cultural factors as proposed by his late colleague John Fei, Ranis proceeds to explore the issues of organic nationalism, natural resource endowment, access to foreign capital and other political factors that have produced such economic success. The author demonstrates how Taiwan's unique combination of strong organic nationalism, meager natural resources and limited access to foreign capital helped curb the Extended Dutch Disease phenomenon endemic in LDCs. In addition, the government's nonoscillatory, relatively...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Economic development; LDC; Political economy; Taiwan; Extended Dutch disease; Democracy; International Development; Political Economy; O10; O11; O50; P16.
Ano: 1997
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/28422

Trade Agreements, Political Economy and Endogenously Incomplete Contracts
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Li,   Na; Ker,   Alan P.
We develop a political economy model of trade agreements following along the line of Grossman and Helpman (1995a) yet incorporating contracting costs, uncertainty and multiple policy instruments. We show that rent-seeking efforts do not affect tariff rates as they are offset by the substitution effect of domestic production subsidies. Similar to Horn et al (2010), we find the coexistence of uncertainty and contracting costs make optimal trade agreements incomplete contracts. Our model helps explain differential treatment on subsidies, countervailing duties, and the national treatment principle - all key provisions of the current WTO agreement.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Trade agreement; Political economy; Contracting cost; Uncertainty JEL Classification:; Agricultural and Food Policy; International Relations/Trade; Political Economy; Public Economics.
Ano: 2011
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/116850

The Political Economy of International Development and Pro-Poor Livestock Policies: A Comparative Assessment
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Leonard,   David K.
Peasant livestock producers are particularly disadvantaged internationally and within their national systems because their political participation tends to be mediated through patron-client ties. The consequence is that poor producers most often trade their collective interests for very modest individual (or village) benefits. These patron-client networks are now being extended internationally, generally making them still less advantageous. Eventually poor livestock producers will address their interests through political associations (i.e. horizontal groupings of peers) rather than clientage (which is vertical in orientation). In the meantime, however, without outside help they are unlikely to engage in effective proactive political action on issues...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Political economy; Livestock policy; Decentralization; New institutional economics; Patron-client relations; Neo-liberalism; Livestock Production/Industries; Political Economy.
Ano: 2004
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/23785

The Political Economy of Pro-Poor Livestock Policy-making in Ethiopia
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Halderman,   Michael.
This paper presents a case study of how livestock policies are made and implemented in a national context, and how they can be improved to better serve the interests of the poor. Livestock are extremely important in Ethiopia and could play a key role in pro-poor development strategy. Livestock are estimated to contribute to the livelihoods of 60-70% of the Ethiopian population. There have been several negative livestock-related trends over the past 20-30 years, however, including a decline in: national and per capita production of livestock products, official livestock and livestock product exports and earnings from exports, and per capita consumption of food from livestock origin.   The study used the key informant method supplemented with official...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Ethiopia; Political economy; Policy-making; Livestock; Pro-poor livestock policies; Livestock marketing; Livestock exports; Unofficial livestock marketing and exports; Cross border trade; SPS standards; Animal health services; Pastoralists; Pastoral areas; Pastoral development; Settling pastoralists; Highland areas; Urban and peri-urban areas; Land tenure; Governance; Decentralization; Civil society; Conflict mitigation; Political feasibility; Livestock Production/Industries; Political Economy.
Ano: 2005
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/23770

Existence of Equilibria in Lobbying Economics
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Coggins,   Jay S.; Graham-Tomasi,   Theodore; Roe,   Terry L.
Governments often establish economic policy in response to political pressure by interest groups. Since these groups' political activities may alter prices, economies so affected cannot be characterized by perfect competition. We develop a model of a "lobbying economy" in which consumers' choice of political activity simultaneously determines relative prices and income levels. They balance the loss in income due to lobbying payments against the potential gain in wealth from a favorable government price policy. This paper proves the existence of an equilibrium in economies of this sort. We reformulate the economy as a generalized lobbying game and prove the existence of a non-cooperative equilibrium in the game. This equilibrium is then shown to be an...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Political economy; Rent seeking; Generalized game; Lobbying equilibrium; Political Economy.
Ano: 1988
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7468

The Political Economy of Downzoning
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Adelaja,   Adesoji O.; Gottlieb,   Paul D.
“Substantial downzoning” is defined as the exercise of police power to significantly reduce the legally permitted density on undeveloped land in a community. This contentious practice is typically challenged by those who perceive the action to limit their market opportunities (e.g., farmers and developers), their sympathizers, and others who prefer the status quo. Supporters tend to be those who perceive positive benefits (e.g., environmentalists, conservationists, and homeowners) and those who see it as a supplement to other preservation techniques, based on concerns over such things as growing public costs of land acquisition, limited effectiveness of existing alternatives, or the perceived urgency to act to manage growth.   Given the complexity of the...
Tipo: Journal Article
Palavras-chave: Substantial downzoning; Takings; Land use; Growth management; Open space; Political economy; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; Political Economy.
Ano: 2009
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/55865

Non-Tariff Barriers as a Test of Political Economy Theories
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Levy,   Philip I.
This paper provides a rough test of a broad and prominent class of political economy of trade models and finds them wanting. The class features governments with weighted social welfare functions, including the prominent model of Grossman and Helpman. Whether the government is the single domestic player or there are other players involved (as with the lobbies in the Grossman-Helpman case) the government ultimately acts as a unitary player in international dealings. Recent work has shown that such unitary actors care exclusively about terms of trade in international negotiations. This paper pursues the implication that governments’ choice of trade instruments may offer a better test of the unitary government framework than existing empirical work. We use the...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Trade policy; Lobbying; Tariffs; Political economy; International Relations/Trade; Political Economy; D72; F13.
Ano: 2003
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/28526

Efficient choice among domestic and trade policies in the Grossman-Helpman Interest-Group Model
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Schleich,   Joachim; Orden,   David.
This paper generalizes the recent political economy model of Helpman and Grossman in which contributions by producer lobbies and government decisions about trade policies are modeled as a common agency game.  We allow the government to choose among domestic as well as trade interventions.  When production and trade policies are available, the equilibrium production policies serve the lobbies while the trade policies reflect the country's international market power.  When consumption and trade policies are available, tariffs and export subsidies are applied in a small-country model to serve the special interests, and the domestic policies are selected to restore consumer prices to world levels.  In a large-country model, the optimal consumption and trade...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Political economy; Trade policies; Domestic subsidies and taxes; Efficient policies; Common agency; International Relations/Trade; F11; F13.
Ano: 1996
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7458

Political Economy of Agricultural Distortions: The Literature to Date
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Swinnen,   Johan F.M.
The 1980s and first half of the 1990s were a very active period in the field of political economy of agricultural protection. While the past decade has witnessed a slowdown in this area, there have been very important developments on political economy in other parts of the economics profession. This paper reviews key new insights and developments in the general political economy literature and draws implications for the study of the political economy of distortions to agricultural incentives.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Distorted incentives; Agricultural and trade policy reforms; National agricultural development; Political economy; Agricultural distortions; High-income countries; Developing countries; Agricultural and Food Policy; International Relations/Trade; F13; F14; Q17; Q18; N50; O13; P16; P26.
Ano: 2009
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/50308

What makes reforms likely: Political economy determinants of reforms in Latin America
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Lora,   Eduardo; Olivera,   Mauricio.
The purpose of this paper is to test the main hypotheses of the recent theoretical literature on the political economy of reform for the case of the Latin American countries between 1985 and 1995. The paper first reviews the literature and extracts the main testable hypotheses. Then, a system of indices that measure the extent of reform in five policy areas is presented. These indices are used as the dependent variables in panel regressions where the main explanatory variables are indicators of crisis, political variables and indicators of channels of contagion. We find very strong support for the well-known hypothesis that crises make reform viable and also for the (less theoretically sound) hypotheses that reforms are more likely at the beginning of...
Tipo: Journal Article
Palavras-chave: Structural reforms; Political economy; Latin America; D78; D72; C52.
Ano: 2004
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/43851

Why are Latin Americans so unhappy about reforms?
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Panizza,   Ugo; Yanez,   Monica.
This paper uses opinion surveys to document discontent with the pro-market reforms implemented by most Latin American countries during the 1990s. The paper also explores four possible sets of explanations for this discontent: (i) a general drift of the populace’s political views to the left; (ii) an increase in political activism by those who oppose reforms; (iii) a decline in the people’s trust of political actors; and (iv) the economic crisis. The paper’s principal finding is that the macroeconomic situation plays an important role in explaining the dissatisfaction with the reform process.
Tipo: Journal Article
Palavras-chave: Political economy; Reforms; Crisis; Latin America; P16; O54.
Ano: 2005
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/37219

Economia política da disputa por terras em Minas Gerais
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Araujo Junior,   Ari Francisco de; Shikida,   Claudio; Alvarenga,   Patricia Silva.
The article analyzes the determinants of the probability of dispute over land (conflicts, occupations and settlement projects) in the Brazilian state of Minas Gerais. Through the use of a logit model, we found that the main influences are political and economical ones. Apparently, the behavior of the agrarian reform’s supporters follows the political incentive, with fewer occurrences of conflicts in towns governed by political allies. By other hand, the economical determinants - degree of poverty and the economic growth - have negative impacts on it.
Tipo: Journal Article
Palavras-chave: Agrarian development; Political economy; Regional economics; Agribusiness; D72; D74; O43.
Ano: 2008
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/61236

Organic Food and Farming: Between Market Subordination and Retailer Growth Prospects
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Kledal,   Paul Rye.
The paper is based on research conducted for DARCOF II (Danish Research Centre for Organic Farming, www.darcof.dk). The aim of the research project is to analyze the future development of the Danish organic food sector through focusing on two agro-commodities: vegetables and pork. Emphasis is placed on identification of economic forces within the supply chains. The main conclusions of the paper - being the results from the organic vegetable chain are that the rules and regulations, and the development of alternative transaction processes in organic food and farming have so far been founded on social counter reactions to the mechanisms of a free market economy that result in the marginalization of farmers, animals welfare and the environment. However,...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation
Palavras-chave: Political economy; Institutional economics; Supply chain management; Organic food &amp; farming; Farmers' treadmill; Retail bargain power; Industrial Organization; Institutional and Behavioral Economics.
Ano: 2005
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/24218

Agricultural Distortion Patterns Since the 1950s: What Needs Explaining?
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Anderson,   Kym; Croser,   Johanna L.; Sandri,   Damiano; Valenzuela,   Ernesto.
This paper summarizes a new database that sheds light on the impact of trade-related policy developments over the past half century on distortions to agricultural incentives and thus also to consumer prices for food in 75 countries spanning the per capita income spectrum. Price-support policies of advanced economies hurt not only domestic consumers and exporters of other products but also foreign producers and traders of farm products, and they reduce national and global economic welfare. On the other hand, the governments of many developing countries have directly taxed their farmers over the past half-century, both directly (e.g., export taxes) and also indirectly via overvaluing their currency and restricting imports of manufactures. Thus the price...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Distorted incentives; Agricultural and trade policy reforms; National agricultural development; Political economy; Agricultural price and trade policies; Agricultural and Food Policy; International Relations/Trade; F13; F14; Q17; Q18; F59; H20; N50; O13.
Ano: 2009
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/50305

Agricultural Protection Growth in Europe, 1870-1969
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Swinnen,   Johan F.M.
Dramatic changes took place in agricultural policies in Europe in the 19th and 20th century. In the 1860s European nations agreed on a series of trade agreements which spread free trade across the continent. In the 1960s European nations concluded an international agreement which spread heavy government intervention and protection against imports across the continent. This paper offers hypotheses as to the causes of these dramatic changes in agricultural protection.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Political economy; Agricultural distortions; High-income countries; Economic development of Europe; F13; N53; O13; Q18; P16.
Ano: 2009
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/50296

Political Selection and the Quality of Government: Evidence from South India
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Besley,   Timothy; Pande,   Rohini; Rao,   Vijayendra.
This paper uses household data from India to examine the economic and social status of village politicians, and how individual and village characteristics affect politician behavior while in office. Education increases the chances of selection to public office and reduces the odds that a politician uses political power opportunistically. In contrast, land ownership and political connections enable selection but do not affect politician opportunism. At the village level, changes in the identity of the politically dominant group alters the group allocation of resources but not politician opportunism. Improved information flows in the village, however, reduce opportunism and improve resource allocation.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Development; Political economy; Public provision of private goods; Decentralization; Political Economy; O12; H11; H42; O20.
Ano: 2005
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/28426

On the Welfare Consequences of Political Activity
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Coggins,   Jay S.
When economic actors are also allowed to become politically active, perhaps to influence a government price policy, they face decision problems with essentially simultaneous political and economic features. If, in addition, two groups struggle to pull the administered price level in opposite directions, an important strategic component is introduced. On two levels, then, such situations depart from the competitive economy framework of Arrow and Debreu. The model of this paper is designed to reconcile the general equilibrium model with politically active interest groups. This model is then used to assess the welfare consequences of such lobbying activity. We find that very often a lobbying program with price distortions is not the best means for regulating...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Political economy; Lobbying behavior; Rent-seeking; Distortionary policy.; Political Economy.
Ano: 1989
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7463

What Determines Evaluation Outcomes? - Evidence from Bi- and Multilateral Development Cooperation -
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Michaelowa,   Katharina; Borrmann,   Axel.
Donor agencies invest considerable financial and human resources to evaluate the outcome of their development activities. To derive institutional conditions conducive to an efficient use of these resources, we develop a multi-level principal-agent model focusing on the various interests of the different actors involved in the evaluation process. The model highlights two central problems: (i) the aid agencies' conflicting objectives of transparency and self-legitimization, and (ii) the potential collusion between the evaluator and the project manager. Empirical evidence for the World Bank and different German donor agencies reveals concrete institutional requirements for a reduced evaluation bias and increased transparency.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Development cooperation; Evaluation; Political economy; International Development; F35; H43; D73.
Ano: 2005
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/26176

Can politicians calm public fears of food-borne risks or do they adopt excessively stringent preventive measures?: A political economy approach
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Arahata,   Katsumi.
The purpose of this paper is to examine politically sensitive food safety problems from the viewpoint of political economy. The model was built in order to clarify the behaviors of consumers and politicians, employing the prospect theory and the median voter theorem. Major findings and policy implications in this study are as follows:     Firstly, as an outcome of the theoretical analysis, it is suggested that politicians may magnify consumers’ excessive response to food scares.     Secondly, several countervailing factors that can mitigate such consumers’ excessive responses may exist. Nevertheless, in Japan, they may be weak or may have become weak and do not mitigate such excessive responses.     Finally, it is recommended that politicians’ staff or...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation
Palavras-chave: Food safety; Political economy; The prospect theory; The median voter theorem; Agricultural and Food Policy; Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety; Political Economy; Public Economics; Q18.
Ano: 2009
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/51621

Political Economy of Anglo-French Trade, 1689-1899:Agricultural Trade Policies, Alcohol Taxes and War
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Nye,   John V.C.
Britain – contrary to received wisdom – was not a free trader for most of the 1800s and, despite repeal of the Corn Laws, continued to have higher tariffs than the French until the last quarter of the century War with Louis XIV from 1689 led to the end of all trade between Britain and France for a quarter of a century. The creation of powerful protected interests both at home and abroad (notably in the form of British merchants, and investors in Portuguese wine) led to the imposition of prohibitively high tariffs on French imports -- notably on wine and spirits -- when trade with France resumed in 1714. Protection of domestic interests from import competition allowed the state to raise domestic excises which provided increased government revenues despite...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Distorted incentives; Agricultural and trade policy reforms; National agricultural development; Political economy; Agricultural trade policies and war; Economic history of Europe; Alcohol taxes; Agricultural and Food Policy; International Relations/Trade; F13; F14; Q17; Q18; H20; N40; N43; N53; O13.
Ano: 2009
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/50295

Special Interests versus the Public Interest in Policy Determination
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Rausser,   Gordon C.; Roland,   Gerard.
This paper focuses on recent theoretical developments in political economy and what role they might play in explaining and reforming individual country and global distortions in food and agricultural markets. Four groups of forces are isolated: political governance structures emphasizing the role of democratic mechanisms; the design of polycentric structures for assigned governmental authority for setting policy instruments; market structure and other socioeconomic characteristics; and the role of sector mobility and asset diversification. Each of these forces are distilled and data sources are reviewed that will allow econometric specifications that have both explanatory and policy reform implications.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: Political economy; Agricultural distortions; Public interest; Vested interests; Agricultural and Food Policy; International Relations/Trade; F13; H23; N50; Q18; O13; P16; P26.
Ano: 2009
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/50294

Competition Among Rent Seeking Groups in General Equilibrium
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Roe,   Terry L.; Graham-Tomasi,   Theodore.
A two sector general equilibrium model is developed in which households can influence the government's choice of the relative price of traded goods and the level of public goods supplied to each sector. The model is used to illustrate key problems addressed by the political economy literature, modeling issues that arise, and the nature of insights that can be obtained that traditional approaches cannot discern.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper
Palavras-chave: General equilibrium; Political economy; Rent seeking; Lobbying; Political Economy.
Ano: 1990
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7483

POLITICAL ECONOMY OF RIGHT-TO-FARM
Provedor de dados: 31
Autores: Adelaja,   Adesoji O.; Friedman,   Keith.
This paper investigates the motivations for local right-to-farm protection ordinances by estimating a logit model relating the adoption of these ordinances to various political, economic and demographic factors previously found to affect the likelihood of passage of farmland preservation policies.  Results suggest that the probability of adopting right-to-farm policies increases with the size and political clout of the farm public and with incentives to promote right-to-farm.  Adoption is not enhanced by environmental concerns, nor by factors known to encourage adoption of farmland preservation policies.  These findings raise serious concerns about the long-run viability of protections afforded agriculture in urbanizing areas.
Tipo: Journal Article
Palavras-chave: Nuisance litigation; Open space; Political economy; Restrictive ordinances; Right-to-farm; Political Economy.
Ano: 1999
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/15161