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Registros recuperados: 49 | |
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Huelemeyer, Kerstin; Schiller, Simone. |
With the Common Monitoring and Evaluation Framework (CMEF) a guidance document for evaluation of rural development policy has been published by the European Commission. The CMEF defines the requirements on monitoring and evaluation and specifies a limited number of quantitative common indicators applicable to each programme. While in general the introduction of the CMEF is considered as being a helpful tool for carrying out evaluation, substantial criticism has been expressed regarding the suggested methodological approach and the provided set of impact indicators. Based on qualitative analyses, this article focuses on contributing to a better understanding of the evaluation process in order to learn from stakeholder perceptions and draw conclusions on how... |
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Evaluation; CMEF; Indicators; Political economy; Success factors; Community/Rural/Urban Development. |
Ano: 2010 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/94920 |
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Margolis, Michael; Shogren, Jason F.. |
Trade has become the main mode of transport for many invasive species including diseases and agricultural pests. Most species are brought to their new homes unintentionally, which constitute a market failure rooted in international trade. Unless it is practical to drive invasion risk to zero, the external costs may justify a tariff. In this paper we analyze the political process likely to govern the formation of tariffs so justified, using a straightforward incorporation of an invasive species externality into Grossman and Helpman's well-known political economy model. We show our measure of disguised protectionism -the gap between the optimal tariff and that set in the equilibrium of the political economy game- is equal to the tariff that would be set if... |
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Invasive species; Protectionism; Tariff; Political economy; Environmental Economics and Policy; Q17; Q56; Q57. |
Ano: 2004 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10770 |
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Ranis, Gustav. |
This paper examines the causes of Taiwan's exceptional economic performance, focusing on the influence of organizational and policy choices and how Taiwan's example differs from those of more typical less-developed countries. After briefly citing cultural factors as proposed by his late colleague John Fei, Ranis proceeds to explore the issues of organic nationalism, natural resource endowment, access to foreign capital and other political factors that have produced such economic success. The author demonstrates how Taiwan's unique combination of strong organic nationalism, meager natural resources and limited access to foreign capital helped curb the Extended Dutch Disease phenomenon endemic in LDCs. In addition, the government's nonoscillatory, relatively... |
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Economic development; LDC; Political economy; Taiwan; Extended Dutch disease; Democracy; International Development; Political Economy; O10; O11; O50; P16. |
Ano: 1997 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/28422 |
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Coggins, Jay S.; Graham-Tomasi, Theodore; Roe, Terry L.. |
Governments often establish economic policy in response to political pressure by interest groups. Since these groups' political activities may alter prices, economies so affected cannot be characterized by perfect competition. We develop a model of a "lobbying economy" in which consumers' choice of political activity simultaneously determines relative prices and income levels. They balance the loss in income due to lobbying payments against the potential gain in wealth from a favorable government price policy. This paper proves the existence of an equilibrium in economies of this sort. We reformulate the economy as a generalized lobbying game and prove the existence of a non-cooperative equilibrium in the game. This equilibrium is then shown to be an... |
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Political economy; Rent seeking; Generalized game; Lobbying equilibrium; Political Economy. |
Ano: 1988 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7468 |
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Adelaja, Adesoji O.; Gottlieb, Paul D.. |
“Substantial downzoning” is defined as the exercise of police power to significantly reduce the legally permitted density on undeveloped land in a community. This contentious practice is typically challenged by those who perceive the action to limit their market opportunities (e.g., farmers and developers), their sympathizers, and others who prefer the status quo. Supporters tend to be those who perceive positive benefits (e.g., environmentalists, conservationists, and homeowners) and those who see it as a supplement to other preservation techniques, based on concerns over such things as growing public costs of land acquisition, limited effectiveness of existing alternatives, or the perceived urgency to act to manage growth. Given the complexity of the... |
Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Substantial downzoning; Takings; Land use; Growth management; Open space; Political economy; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; Political Economy. |
Ano: 2009 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/55865 |
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Levy, Philip I.. |
This paper provides a rough test of a broad and prominent class of political economy of trade models and finds them wanting. The class features governments with weighted social welfare functions, including the prominent model of Grossman and Helpman. Whether the government is the single domestic player or there are other players involved (as with the lobbies in the Grossman-Helpman case) the government ultimately acts as a unitary player in international dealings. Recent work has shown that such unitary actors care exclusively about terms of trade in international negotiations. This paper pursues the implication that governments choice of trade instruments may offer a better test of the unitary government framework than existing empirical work. We use the... |
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Trade policy; Lobbying; Tariffs; Political economy; International Relations/Trade; Political Economy; D72; F13. |
Ano: 2003 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/28526 |
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Lora, Eduardo; Olivera, Mauricio. |
The purpose of this paper is to test the main hypotheses of the recent theoretical literature on the political economy of reform for the case of the Latin American countries between 1985 and 1995. The paper first reviews the literature and extracts the main testable hypotheses. Then, a system of indices that measure the extent of reform in five policy areas is presented. These indices are used as the dependent variables in panel regressions where the main explanatory variables are indicators of crisis, political variables and indicators of channels of contagion. We find very strong support for the well-known hypothesis that crises make reform viable and also for the (less theoretically sound) hypotheses that reforms are more likely at the beginning of... |
Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Structural reforms; Political economy; Latin America; D78; D72; C52. |
Ano: 2004 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/43851 |
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Panizza, Ugo; Yanez, Monica. |
This paper uses opinion surveys to document discontent with the pro-market reforms implemented by most Latin American countries during the 1990s. The paper also explores four possible sets of explanations for this discontent: (i) a general drift of the populace’s political views to the left; (ii) an increase in political activism by those who oppose reforms; (iii) a decline in the people’s trust of political actors; and (iv) the economic crisis. The paper’s principal finding is that the macroeconomic situation plays an important role in explaining the dissatisfaction with the reform process. |
Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Political economy; Reforms; Crisis; Latin America; P16; O54. |
Ano: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/37219 |
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Registros recuperados: 49 | |
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