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	Provedor de dados AgEcon (49) Autor Ando, Amy Whritenour (3) Swinnen, Johan F.M. (3) Adelaja, Adesoji O. (2) Anderson, Kym (2) Coggins, Jay S. (2) Graham-Tomasi, Theodore (2) Lopez, Rigoberto A. (2) Roe, Terry L. (2) Alston, Julian M. (1) Alvarenga, Patricia Silva (1) Arahata, Katsumi (1) Araujo Junior, Ari Francisco de (1) Bates, Robert H. (1) Besley, Timothy (1) Block, Steven A. (1) Borrmann, Axel (1) Boyd, James (1) Brennan, Timothy J. (1) Carter, Colin A. (1) Croser, Johanna L. (1) Mais... Palavra-chave Political economy (49) Political Economy (19) Agricultural and Food Policy (18) International Relations/Trade (17) F13 (13) Q18 (13) Q17 (11) O13 (10) Agricultural and trade policy reforms (8) Distorted incentives (8) F14 (8) National agricultural development (8) P16 (7) D72 (6) Environmental Economics and Policy (5) International Development (5) N50 (5) Agribusiness (4) Agricultural distortions (4) D78 (4) Mais... Tipo do documento Working or Discussion Paper (32) Conference Paper or Presentation (10) Journal Article (7) Ano 2011 (3) 2010 (3) 2009 (14) 2008 (1) 2005 (7) 2004 (4) 2003 (3) 2002 (2) 1999 (3) 1998 (1) 1997 (1) 1996 (2) 1994 (1) 1990 (1) 1989 (2) 1988 (1) Mais... País United States (49) Idioma Inglês (48) Português (1)		Ordenar por:  Relevância Autor Título Ano Registros recuperados: 49 Primeira ... 1 2 3 ... Última Agricultural Protection Growth in Europe, 1870-1969 AgEcon Swinnen, Johan F.M.. Dramatic changes took place in agricultural policies in Europe in the 19th and 20th century. In the 1860s European nations agreed on a series of trade agreements which spread free trade across the continent. In the 1960s European nations concluded an international agreement which spread heavy government intervention and protection against imports across the continent. This paper offers hypotheses as to the causes of these dramatic changes in agricultural protection. Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Political economy; Agricultural distortions; High-income countries; Economic development of Europe; F13; N53; O13; Q18; P16. Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/50296 Political Selection and the Quality of Government: Evidence from South India AgEcon Besley, Timothy; Pande, Rohini; Rao, Vijayendra. This paper uses household data from India to examine the economic and social status of village politicians, and how individual and village characteristics affect politician behavior while in office. Education increases the chances of selection to public office and reduces the odds that a politician uses political power opportunistically. In contrast, land ownership and political connections enable selection but do not affect politician opportunism. At the village level, changes in the identity of the politically dominant group alters the group allocation of resources but not politician opportunism. Improved information flows in the village, however, reduce opportunism and improve resource allocation. Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Development; Political economy; Public provision of private goods; Decentralization; Political Economy; O12; H11; H42; O20. Ano: 2005 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/28426 On the Welfare Consequences of Political Activity AgEcon Coggins, Jay S.. When economic actors are also allowed to become politically active, perhaps to influence a government price policy, they face decision problems with essentially simultaneous political and economic features. If, in addition, two groups struggle to pull the administered price level in opposite directions, an important strategic component is introduced. On two levels, then, such situations depart from the competitive economy framework of Arrow and Debreu. The model of this paper is designed to reconcile the general equilibrium model with politically active interest groups. This model is then used to assess the welfare consequences of such lobbying activity. We find that very often a lobbying program with price distortions is not the best means for regulating... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Political economy; Lobbying behavior; Rent-seeking; Distortionary policy.; Political Economy. Ano: 1989 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7463 What Determines Evaluation Outcomes? - Evidence from Bi- and Multilateral Development Cooperation - AgEcon Michaelowa, Katharina; Borrmann, Axel. Donor agencies invest considerable financial and human resources to evaluate the outcome of their development activities. To derive institutional conditions conducive to an efficient use of these resources, we develop a multi-level principal-agent model focusing on the various interests of the different actors involved in the evaluation process. The model highlights two central problems: (i) the aid agencies' conflicting objectives of transparency and self-legitimization, and (ii) the potential collusion between the evaluator and the project manager. Empirical evidence for the World Bank and different German donor agencies reveals concrete institutional requirements for a reduced evaluation bias and increased transparency. Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Development cooperation; Evaluation; Political economy; International Development; F35; H43; D73. Ano: 2005 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/26176 Can politicians calm public fears of food-borne risks or do they adopt excessively stringent preventive measures?: A political economy approach AgEcon Arahata, Katsumi. The purpose of this paper is to examine politically sensitive food safety problems from the viewpoint of political economy. The model was built in order to clarify the behaviors of consumers and politicians, employing the prospect theory and the median voter theorem. Major findings and policy implications in this study are as follows: Firstly, as an outcome of the theoretical analysis, it is suggested that politicians may magnify consumers’ excessive response to food scares. Secondly, several countervailing factors that can mitigate such consumers’ excessive responses may exist. Nevertheless, in Japan, they may be weak or may have become weak and do not mitigate such excessive responses. Finally, it is recommended that politicians’ staff or... Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Food safety; Political economy; The prospect theory; The median voter theorem; Agricultural and Food Policy; Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety; Political Economy; Public Economics; Q18. Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/51621 Political Economy of Anglo-French Trade, 1689-1899:Agricultural Trade Policies, Alcohol Taxes and War AgEcon Nye, John V.C.. Britain – contrary to received wisdom – was not a free trader for most of the 1800s and, despite repeal of the Corn Laws, continued to have higher tariffs than the French until the last quarter of the century War with Louis XIV from 1689 led to the end of all trade between Britain and France for a quarter of a century. The creation of powerful protected interests both at home and abroad (notably in the form of British merchants, and investors in Portuguese wine) led to the imposition of prohibitively high tariffs on French imports -- notably on wine and spirits -- when trade with France resumed in 1714. Protection of domestic interests from import competition allowed the state to raise domestic excises which provided increased government revenues despite... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Distorted incentives; Agricultural and trade policy reforms; National agricultural development; Political economy; Agricultural trade policies and war; Economic history of Europe; Alcohol taxes; Agricultural and Food Policy; International Relations/Trade; F13; F14; Q17; Q18; H20; N40; N43; N53; O13. Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/50295 Special Interests versus the Public Interest in Policy Determination AgEcon Rausser, Gordon C.; Roland, Gerard. This paper focuses on recent theoretical developments in political economy and what role they might play in explaining and reforming individual country and global distortions in food and agricultural markets. Four groups of forces are isolated: political governance structures emphasizing the role of democratic mechanisms; the design of polycentric structures for assigned governmental authority for setting policy instruments; market structure and other socioeconomic characteristics; and the role of sector mobility and asset diversification. Each of these forces are distilled and data sources are reviewed that will allow econometric specifications that have both explanatory and policy reform implications. Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Political economy; Agricultural distortions; Public interest; Vested interests; Agricultural and Food Policy; International Relations/Trade; F13; H23; N50; Q18; O13; P16; P26. Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/50294 Competition Among Rent Seeking Groups in General Equilibrium AgEcon Roe, Terry L.; Graham-Tomasi, Theodore. A two sector general equilibrium model is developed in which households can influence the government's choice of the relative price of traded goods and the level of public goods supplied to each sector. The model is used to illustrate key problems addressed by the political economy literature, modeling issues that arise, and the nature of insights that can be obtained that traditional approaches cannot discern. Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: General equilibrium; Political economy; Rent seeking; Lobbying; Political Economy. Ano: 1990 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7483 POLITICAL ECONOMY OF RIGHT-TO-FARM AgEcon Adelaja, Adesoji O.; Friedman, Keith. This paper investigates the motivations for local right-to-farm protection ordinances by estimating a logit model relating the adoption of these ordinances to various political, economic and demographic factors previously found to affect the likelihood of passage of farmland preservation policies. Results suggest that the probability of adopting right-to-farm policies increases with the size and political clout of the farm public and with incentives to promote right-to-farm. Adoption is not enhanced by environmental concerns, nor by factors known to encourage adoption of farmland preservation policies. These findings raise serious concerns about the long-run viability of protections afforded agriculture in urbanizing areas. Tipo: Journal Article Palavras-chave: Nuisance litigation; Open space; Political economy; Restrictive ordinances; Right-to-farm; Political Economy. Ano: 1999 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/15161 Registros recuperados: 49 Primeira ... 1 2 3 ... Última

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