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| Registros recuperados: 18 | |
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| Bullock, David S.; Minot, Nicholas. |
| Our purpose is to present in detail numerical methods of measuring the value of nonmarket goods using market data, under either weak neutrality, weak complementarity, or any other preference restriction meeting the requirements discussed in this paper. It has been claimed in a number of places in the literature that numerical methods cannot be used to measure the value of nonmarket goods unless the very restrictive Willig conditions are satisfied. We show that this claim is mistaken, and that numerical methods can be used whether or not the Willig conditions are satisfied. Our numerical methods are more flexible than the existing analytical method because ours can be used with any Marshallian demand system. |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Resource /Energy Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2006 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25272 |
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| Mittenzwei, Klaus; Bullock, David S.; Salhofer, Klaus; Kola, Jukka. |
| Positive political economy is usually concerned with economic explanations of observed policy choices, while the timing of a policy reform has not gained similar attention. This is somewhat surprising since policy makers most often are free to decide both the design and timing of a policy reform. Drawing on insights from recent developments in the finance literature on investment under uncertainty, here we apply the idea of option value to the analysis of government policy making. Common political-economic explanations of the 1992 CAP reform are that policymakers felt domestic political pressure to make the CAP more efficient, and also international political pressure and to bring the CAP in line with treaty obligations. Although these arguments are sound,... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Agricultural and Food Policy. |
| Ano: 2009 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/50957 |
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| Bullock, David S.; Rutstrom, Elisabet E.. |
| We present a transfer-seeking model of political economy in which the size of the transfer is determined endogenously, and in which over-dissipation of rents is predicted even under conditions of risk-neutrality and perfect rationality. We implement an empirical test of this model by collecting behavioral data in a laboratory experiment. We confirm the existence of behavior that leads to over-dissipation of rents in games with both symmetric and asymmetric political power. We also confirm the hypotheses that lowering the political power of one player can lead to smaller rent-seeking expenditures and to larger transfers. We observe behavior that deviates from dominant strategies. |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Political Economy. |
| Ano: 2001 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/20447 |
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| Desquilbet, Marion; Bullock, David S.. |
| The paper analyzes the welfare effects of the introduction of GMO technology into a market in which a fraction of consumers refuses to buy GMOs. Our theoretical model recognizes that segregation and identity preservation (IP) of non-GMOs may create costs for both IP producers and non-IP producers. Our results show how GMO-hating consumers may win or lose from the introduction of GMO technology. If IP creates costs for non-IP producers, indifferent consumers and GMO producers may be made worse off because others refuse to consume GMOs. If GMO rejection is strong, IP producers win when GMOs are introduced, even though they do not produce GMOs. |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety. |
| Ano: 2003 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/22011 |
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| Bullock, David S.; Salhofer, Klaus. |
| Recent studies have investigated the efficiencies of policies that use several policy instruments simultaneously (for example, a policy that uses a production subsidy combined with a production quota). Several studies of very specific cases find that optimal combination of two policy instruments is more efficient than optimal independent use of either. In this note we demonstrate using set theory and maximization theory, that all such specific results are examples of a more general result, which is that by combining m instruments efficiently, a government can always be at least as efficient as when using a subset of those m instruments. This result holds for any of the several definitions of "efficiency" in the literature. |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Agricultural and Food Policy. |
| Ano: 1998 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/31524 |
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| Bullock, David S.. |
| Rausser and Freebairn (1974) proposed a method for empirically measuring the political power of interest groups competing in real-world political economies. In the first half of the 1990s, staunch criticism of PPF methodology appeared. Von Cramon-Taubadel (1992) obtained counter-intuitive results in PPF simulations using a simple model of EU wheat and barley policy instrument use. Bullock (1994) emphasized that PPF methodology requires that observed policy be Pareto efficient policy, which requires researchers to manipulate the dimensions of their models so that the number of interest groups is exactly one more than the number of policy instruments. He concluded “[PPF methods] need not reveal anything meaningful about interest group political power, and... |
| Tipo: Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Political Economy; Q18; Q16; Q48. |
| Ano: 2012 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/124118 |
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| Registros recuperados: 18 | |
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