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| Registros recuperados: 25 | |
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| Bosetti, Valentina; Carraro, Carlo; Sgobbi, Alessandra; Tavoni, Massimo. |
| Despite the growing concern about actual on-going climate change, there is little consensus about the scale and timing of actions needed to stabilise the concentrations of greenhouse gases. Many countries are unwilling to implement effective mitigation strategies, at least in the short-term, and no agreement on an ambitious global stabilisation target has yet been reached. It is thus likely that some, if not all countries, will delay the adoption of effective climate policies. This delay will affect the cost of future policy measures that will be required to abate an even larger amount of emissions. What additional economic cost of mitigation measures will this delay imply? At the same time, the uncertainty surrounding the global stabilisation target to be... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Uncertainty; Climate Policy; Stabilisation Costs; Delayed Action; Environmental Economics and Policy; C72; H23; Q25; Q28. |
| Ano: 2008 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/44219 |
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| Sgobbi, Alessandra; Carraro, Carlo. |
| The objective of this paper is to investigate the usefulness of non-cooperative bargaining theory for the analysis of negotiations on water allocation and management. We explore the impacts of different economic incentives, a stochastic environment and varying individual preferences on players strategies and equilibrium outcomes through numerical simulations of a multilateral, multiple issues, non-cooperative bargaining model of water allocation in the Piave River Basin, in the North East of Italy. Players negotiate in an alternating-offer manner over the sharing of water resources (quantity and quality). Exogenous uncertainty over the size of the negotiated amount of water is introduced to capture the fact that water availability is not known with... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Bargaining; Non-Cooperative Game Theory; Simulation Models; Uncertainty; Environmental Economics and Policy; C61; C71; C78. |
| Ano: 2007 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7446 |
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| Bosetti, Valentina; Paltsev, Sergey; Reilly, John M.; Carraro, Carlo. |
| In the absence of significant greenhouse gas (GHG) mitigation, many analysts project that atmospheric concentrations of species identified for control in the Kyoto protocol could exceed 1000 ppm (carbon-dioxide-equivalent) by 2100 from the current levels of about 435 ppm. This could lead to global average temperature increases of between 2.5 and 6°C by the end of the century. There are risks of even greater warming given that underlying uncertainties in emissions projections and climate response are substantial. Stabilization of GHG concentrations that would have a reasonable chance of meeting temperature targets identified in international negotiations would require significant reductions in GHG emissions below “business-as-usual” levels, and indeed from... |
| Tipo: Working Paper |
Palavras-chave: Emissions Pricing; Climate Stabilization; Environmental Economics and Policy; Q54; Q58. |
| Ano: 2011 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/119102 |
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| Bosetti, Valentina; Carraro, Carlo; De Cian, Enrica; Duval, Romain; Massetti, Emanuele; Tavoni, Massimo. |
| This paper uses WITCH, an integrated assessment model with a game-theoretic structure, to explore the prospects for, and the stability of broad coalitions to achieve ambitious climate change mitigation action. Only coalitions including all large emitting regions are found to be technically able to meet a concentration stabilisation target below 550 ppm CO2eq by 2100. Once the free-riding incentives of non-participants are taken into account, only a “grand coalition” including virtually all regions can be successful. This grand coalition is profitable as a whole, implying that all countries can gain from participation provided appropriate transfers are made across them. However, neither the grand coalition nor smaller but still environmentally significant... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Climate Policy; Climate Coalition; Game Theory; Free Riding; Environmental Economics and Policy; C68; C72; D58; Q54. |
| Ano: 2009 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/54281 |
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| Bosetti, Valentina; Carraro, Carlo; Massetti, Emanuele. |
| Most analyses of the Kyoto flexibility mechanisms focus on the cost effectiveness of “where” flexibility (e.g. by showing that mitigation costs are lower in a global permit market than in regional markets or in permit markets confined to Annex 1 countries). Less attention has been devoted to “when” flexibility, i.e. to the benefits of allowing emission permit traders to bank their permits for future use. In the model presented in this paper, banking of carbon allowances in a global permit market is fully endogenised, i.e. agents may decide to bank permits by taking into account their present and future needs and the present and future decisions of all the other agents. It is therefore possible to identify under what conditions traders find it optimal to... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Emission Trading; Banking; Environmental Economics and Policy; International Relations/Trade; C72; H23; Q25; Q28. |
| Ano: 2008 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/6362 |
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| Carraro, Carlo; Massetti, Emanuele; Nicita, Lea. |
| This paper analyses whether and how a climate policy designed to stabilize greenhouse gases in the atmosphere is likely to change the direction and pace of technical progress. The analysis is performed using an upgraded version of WITCH, a dynamic integrated regional model of the world economy. In this version, a non-energy R&D Sector, which enhances the productivity of the capital-labor aggregate, has been added to the energy R&D sector included in the original WITCH model. We find that, as a consequence of climate policy, R&D is re-directed towards energy knowledge. Nonetheless, total R&D investments decrease, due to a more than proportional contraction of non-energy R&D. Indeed, when non-energy and energy inputs are weakly... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Technical Change; Climate Policy; Stabilization Cost; R&D Investments; Environmental Economics and Policy; C72; H23; Q25; Q28. |
| Ano: 2009 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/50357 |
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| Bosetti, Valentina; Carraro, Carlo; Galeotti, Marzio. |
| The issue of greenhouse gas (GHG) stabilization stands on three critical open questions. Namely, what are the impacts deriving from different levels of climate change and their distribution. What are the levels at which GHG concentration should be stabilized in order to avoid unacceptable impacts. And, finally, what are the costs and what are the instruments available to reach such stabilization targets. In the present paper, we address the latter question, in the specific attempt of shedding some light on the debated role of technological progress in lowering the costs of GHG stabilization. In particular, we use an optimal growth climate-economy model, where technical change is endogenously driven by learning by researching and learning by doing. In the... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2006 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/12050 |
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| Bosetti, Valentina; Carraro, Carlo; De Cian, Enrica; Massetti, Emanuele; Tavoni, Massimo. |
| This paper analyses the incentives to participate in and the stability of international climate coalitions. Using the integrated assessment model WITCH, the analysis of coalitions’ profitability and stability is performed under alternative assumptions concerning the pure rate of time preference, the social welfare aggregator and the extent of climate damages. We focus on the profitability, stability, and “potential stability” of a number of coalitions which are “potentially effective” in reducing emissions. We find that only the grand coalition under a specific sets of assumptions finds it optimal to stabilise GHG concentration below 550 ppm CO2-eq. However, the grand coalition is found not to be stable, not even “potentially stable” even through an... |
| Tipo: Working Paper |
Palavras-chave: Climate Policy; Climate Coalition; Game Theory; Free Riding; Environmental Economics and Policy; C68; C72; D58; Q54. |
| Ano: 2011 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/120048 |
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| Sgobbi, Alessandra; Carraro, Carlo. |
| The relevance of bargaining to everyday life can easily be ascertained, yet the study of any bargaining process is extremely hard, involving a multiplicity of questions and complex issues. The objective of this paper is to provide new insights on some dimensions of the bargaining process asymmetries and uncertainties in particular by using a non-cooperative game theory approach. We develop a computational model which simulates the process of negotiation among more than two players, who bargain over the sharing of more than one pie. Through numerically simulating several multiple issues negotiation games among multiple players, we identify the main features of players optimal strategies and equilibrium agreements. As in most economic situations,... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Bargaining; Non-Cooperative Game Theory; Simulation Models; Uncertainty; Risk and Uncertainty; C61; C71; C78. |
| Ano: 2007 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/8224 |
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| Carraro, Carlo; De Cian, Enrica; Nicita, Lea. |
| Climate-economy models aiming at quantifying the costs and effects of climate change impacts and policies have become important tools for climate policy decision-making. Although there are several important dimensions along which models differ, this paper focuses on a key component of climate change economics and policy, namely technical change. This paper tackles the issues of whether technical change is biased towards the energy sectors, the importance of the elasticity of substitution between factors in determining this bias and how mitigation policy is likely to affect it. The analysis is performed using the World Induced Technical Change model, WITCH. Three different versions of the model are proposed. The starting set-up includes endogenous technical... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Technical Change; Climate Policy; Stabilization Cost; Environmental Economics and Policy; C72; H23; Q25; Q28. |
| Ano: 2010 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/59376 |
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| Buchner, Barbara K.; Carraro, Carlo; Ellerman, A. Denny. |
| This paper is the concluding chapter of Rights, Rents and Fairness: Allocation in the European Emissions Trading Scheme, edited by the co-authors and forthcoming from Cambridge University Press. The main objective of this paper is to distill the lessons and general principles to be learnt from the allocation of allowances in the European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS), i.e. in the worlds first experience with allocating carbon allowances to sub-national entities. We discuss the lessons that emerge from this experience and make some comments on what seem to be more general principles informing the allocation process and on what are the global implications of the EU ETS. As has become obvious during the first allocation phase, the diversity of... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2006 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/12033 |
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| Carraro, Carlo; Massetti, Emanuele. |
| The paper examines future energy and emissions scenarios in China, presenting historical data and scenarios generated using the Integrated Assessment Model WITCH. A Business-as-Usual scenario is compared with four scenarios in which Greenhouse Gases emissions are taxed, at different levels. Key insights are provided to evaluate the Chinese pledge to reduce the emissions intensity of Gross Domestic Product by 40/45 percent in 2020 contained in the Copenhagen Accord. Marginal and total abatement costs are discussed using the OECD economies as a term of comparison. Cost estimates for different emissions reduction targets are used to assess the political feasibility of the 50 percent global reduction target set by the G8 and Major Economies Forum in July 2009. |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Climate Change; China; Energy Efficiency; Energy and Development; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; Q4. |
| Ano: 2011 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/101294 |
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| Registros recuperados: 25 | |
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