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	Provedor de dados AgEcon (2) Autor Comerford, Emma (2) Binney, Jim (1) Palavra-chave Auctions (1) Conservation covenants (1) Land Economics/Use (1) Market-based instruments (1) Q50 (1) Q57 (1) Q58 (1) Resource /Energy Economics and Policy (1) Vegetation management (1) Mais... Tipo do documento Conference Paper or Presentation (2) Ano 2007 (1) 2006 (1) País United States (2) Idioma Inglês (2)		Ordenar por:  Relevância Autor Título Ano Registros recuperados: 2 Primeira ... 1 ... Última Using Auctions for Conservation Contracts to Protect Queensland's Vegetation: Lessons from the Vegetation Incentives Program AgEcon Comerford, Emma; Binney, Jim. Auctions for conservation contracts are experiencing great popularity in Australia due to their perceived cost effectiveness. However, there is still much to be learned about this economic instrument. Queensland's state government recently decided to use an auction mechanism to allocate a $12 million incentives program. This was called the Queensland Vegetation Incentives Package (VIP), and was aimed at encouraging better protection and management of high value non-remnant vegetation. The PhD work of the presenting author is using the VIP as a case study to explore the use of auctions for conservation contracts in Queensland. In particular, observing the VIP gives insight into participant behaviour and the impact of the policy formation process on an... Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Land Economics/Use; Q50; Q57; Q58. Ano: 2006 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25495 Influences on bid prices in the Vegetation Incentives Program AgEcon Comerford, Emma. In a conservation auction there are many possible influences on bid prices. This paper considers a range of factors that influenced the bids submitted to the Queensland Government’'s Vegetation Incentives Program (VIP). The relationships between total bid price and a variety of variables are examined. The VIP appears to be a unique example of a program that asks landholders to separate management and covenant costs in their tender. Forgoing payment on the covenant may be an indicator of low opportunity cost or altruism on the part of the landholder. Accordingly this paper also investigates the influences on covenant bids. Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Auctions; Market-based instruments; Vegetation management; Conservation covenants; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy. Ano: 2007 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10421 Registros recuperados: 2 Primeira ... 1 ... Última

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