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| Endoh, Masahiro; Hamada, Koichi. |
| The Lerner paradox is the possibility that a tariff on an import good might worsen a countrys terms of trade, and the Metzler paradox is the possibility that a tariff on an import good might reduce a countrys import price. In a general equilibrium framework with multiple goods, this paper shows that the combination of the invertibility of the Slutsky matrix for the world economy and its similarity across countries will preclude both of the paradoxes, and that the combination of the gross-substitutes assumption for the world demand and the substitute assumption for the demand of an import country property of goods will preclude the Lerner paradox. A modified condition for the Slutsky matrix combined with the gross substitute for the world demand will do... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: International Relations/Trade. |
| Ano: 2006 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/28495 |
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| Endoh, Masahiro. |
| This paper examines the effects of lobbying activities across international borders, on determining each countrys import tariff in a multi-principal, multi-agent, menu-auction model. Cross-border political donations could promote international policy cooperation because of two of their distinctive characteristics. First, special interest groups use cross-border donations as tools to wield their influence on ruling parties of other countries directly, which promotes efficiency of policy formation. Second, for ruling parties of countries, cross-border donations make them take into account the impact of their policy on other countries, which makes them more sensitive to other countries welfare and, therefore, more cooperative with others. When ruling... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Cross-border donations; Truthful equilibrium; Pareto-efficient tariffs; Public Economics; D72; F13; H21; P48. |
| Ano: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/28397 |
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