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	Provedor de dados AgEcon (6) Autor Folmer, Henk (6) Do, Kim Hang Pham (2) Heijman, Wim J.M. (1) Leen, Auke R. (1) Norde, Henk (1) Withagen, Cees (1) van Kooten, G. Cornelis (1) van der Vlist, Arno (1) von Mouche, Pierre (1) Mais... Palavra-chave Environmental Economics and Policy (3) Resource /Energy Economics and Policy (3) C72 (2) Agribusiness (1) Austrian economics (1) B29 (1) C71 (1) Competitive equilibrium (1) Consumer/Household Economics (1) Contract law (1) Convex Analysis (1) Crop Production/Industries (1) D24 (1) D62 (1) D74 (1) Environmental Policy (1) Environmental stringency (1) Firm performance (1) Fishery management (1) Folk Theorem (1) Mais... Tipo do documento Conference Paper or Presentation (3) Working or Discussion Paper (3) Ano 2007 (1) 2006 (2) 2005 (1) 2004 (1) 2001 (1) País United States (6) Idioma Inglês (6)		Ordenar por:  Relevância Autor Título Ano Registros recuperados: 6 Primeira ... 1 ... Última Regional Fishery Management Organization as Games in Coalitional Form AgEcon Do, Kim Hang Pham; Folmer, Henk. This paper examines how a Regional Fisheries Management Organization (RFMO) might successfully achieve effective control of a high seas fishery in the context of partial cooperation. We analyse the feasible allocations of property rights among members of a given RFMO and coalitions of potential entrants. We demonstrate that the modified Shapley value is an appropriate device for the division of the gains from both partial and full cooperations. Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: International fisheries; Overexploitation; Partial cooperation; Games in partition function form; Competitive equilibrium; Modified Shapley value; Agribusiness; Crop Production/Industries; Environmental Economics and Policy; Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy. Ano: 2004 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/97792 Linking of Repeated Games. When Does It Lead to More Cooperation and Pareto Improvements? AgEcon von Mouche, Pierre; Folmer, Henk. Linking of repeated games and exchange of concessions in fields of relative strength may lead to more cooperation and to Pareto improvements relative to the situation where each game is played separately. In this paper we formalize these statements, provide some general results concerning the conditions for more cooperation and Pareto improvements to materialize or not and analyze the relation between both. Special attention is paid to the role of asymmetries. Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Environmental Policy; Linking; Folk Theorem; Tensor Game; Prsioners; Full Cooperation; Pareto Efficiency; Minkowski Sum; Vector Maximum; Convex Analysis; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; C72. Ano: 2007 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/9557 Deforestation AgEcon Folmer, Henk; van Kooten, G. Cornelis. Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; Q10; Q23; Q58; R14. Ano: 2006 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/37035 Fishery Management Games: How to reduce effort and admit new members AgEcon Do, Kim Hang Pham; Folmer, Henk; Norde, Henk. This paper addresses the two main problems that Regional Fishery Management Organizations face. First, how to induce independent nations to reduce their fishing efforts from the competitive equilibrium to prevent the fish stock from extinction or to increase profits. We argue that adjustment from the Nash equilibrium to a state of sustainable yield can be achieved by means of the proportional rule without harming any of the countries involved. Next we propose the population monotonic allocation scheme as management rule for the second problem: the division of profits within an Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Fishery management; Proportional rule; Population monotonic allocation scheme; Shapley value; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; C71; C72; D62; D74; Q22. Ano: 2006 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/31964 Product liability: the normative Austrian perspective AgEcon Folmer, Henk; Heijman, Wim J.M.; Leen, Auke R.. The paper is an exercise in a normative economic analysis of product liability. After a short historical introduction, we take two of the basic premises of Austrian economic thought and see which system of product liability results. If costs are subjective and entrepreneurship is the essence of an efficient market process a system of caveat emptor follows. The paper also answers some possible criticisms from the mainstream neoclassical perspective. Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Austrian economics; Product liability; Contract law; Consumer/Household Economics; B29; K12; K13. Ano: 2001 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/43020 Testing Porter's Hypothesis: A Stochastic Frontier Panel Data Analysis of Dutch Horticulture AgEcon van der Vlist, Arno; Withagen, Cees; Folmer, Henk. We propose a test of the Porter hypothesis for the Dutch horticulture sector, using a stochastic production frontier analysis allowing for an inclusion of policy variables to account for the effect of environmental policy of firm performance. We find considerable heterogeneity in the way firms react to environmental policy measures. Our estimation results indicate, for example, that a 1997 voluntary agreement covering energy, nutrient and pesticides use enhances technical efficiency of vegetable and plants growers, contrary to specialised flower growers. Specialised flower growers, however, did react to the 1993 multi-year agreement on energy reduction, contrary to vegetable and plant growers. Summarising, our findings are mixed but do not seem to reject... Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Firm performance; Environmental stringency; Technical efficiency; Environmental Economics and Policy; Production Economics; D24; Q12; Q50. Ano: 2005 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/24641 Registros recuperados: 6 Primeira ... 1 ... Última

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