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| Wimalasuriya, Rukman; Ha, Arthur; Tsafack, Esther; Larson, Kristoffer. |
| Conventional wisdom holds that rainfall variability represents a significant source of agriculture production risk. Surprisingly, there have been very few economic analyses exploring the link between rainfall variability and agriculture production. This paper is intended to investigate the factual basis of this assumption and to inform future government policy in such areas as drought, climate change adaptation and water policy. We investigate whether rainfall variability has had an actual impact on agricultural production, specifically dryland cropping in Victorian regions during the period 1982-83 to 2004-05. |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Productivity Analysis; Risk and Uncertainty. |
| Ano: 2008 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/6000 |
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| Strappazzon, Loris; Ha, Arthur; Eigenraam, Mark; Duke, Charlotte; Stoneham, Gary. |
| The efficiency implications of different property right allocations when two environmental goods can be produced under the condition of economies of scope are analysed. It is assumed that an environmental agency – acting on behalf of the community – employs an auction‐based mechanism to buy biodiversity services from farmers. However, farmers’ production of biodiversity produces a second good as a by‐product (e.g., mitigation of a river pollutant) that is valued by point‐source emitters who are engaged in a pollution trading market. The efficiency implications of allocating the property right of the good, mitigation, to either the agency or farmers are analysed. If the agency owns the mitigation then the agency can sell mitigation to point‐source emitters,... |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Resource /Energy Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2003 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/116171 |
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| Stoneham, Gary; Chaudhri, Vivek; Ha, Arthur; Strappazzon, Loris. |
| The present paper proposes that markets for nature conservation on private land are missing because of the problem of asymmetric information. An auction of conservation contracts was designed to reveal hidden information needed to facilitate meaningful transactions between landholders and government. The present paper describes the key elements of auction and contract design employed and the results obtained from a pilot auction of conservation contracts run in two regions of Victoria. The pilot demonstrated that it was possible to create at least the supply side of a market for nature conservation and in conjunction with a defined budget, prices were discovered and resources allocated through contracts with landholders. The present paper compares a... |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Resource /Energy Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2003 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/118151 |
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| Ha, Arthur; Dyack, Brenda; Stoneham, Gary; Farquharson, Robert J.; Scarborough, Helen; Duke, Charlotte; Wheeler, Sarah Ann; Saunders, Caroline M.; Nicholls, Neville; Essex, Christopher; McKitrick, Ross. |
| Tipo: Article |
Palavras-chave: Teaching/Communication/Extension/Profession. |
| Ano: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/118506 |
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