Sabiia Seb
PortuguêsEspañolEnglish
Embrapa
        Busca avançada

Botão Atualizar


Botão Atualizar

Ordenar por: 

RelevânciaAutorTítuloAnoImprime registros no formato resumido
Registros recuperados: 3
Primeira ... 1 ... Última
Imagem não selecionada

Imprime registro no formato completo
Water pricing options for the Middle Drâa River Basin in Morocco AgEcon
Heidecke, Claudia; Kuhn, Arnim; Klose, Stephan.
This paper discusses the possible effects of various ways of charging for water in an integrated modeling framework adapted to the Drâa River Basin in southeastern Morocco. Declining surface water availability in the basin has led to an increase in groundwater use for irrigation in recent decades, even though groundwater extraction is more costly than using surface water. The trade-off between the pricing of ground and surface water is discussed based on recursive-dynamic simulations over a ten-year period. The results identify groundwater pricing as an economically and environmentally favorable option, assuming that revenues from water charges are redistributed to farmers.
Tipo: Journal Article Palavras-chave: River basin model; Water pricing; Water management; Conjunctive water use; Morocco; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy.
Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/56961
Imagem não selecionada

Imprime registro no formato completo
Can Hydro-economic River Basis Models Simulate Water Shadow Prices Under Asymmetric Access? AgEcon
Britz, Wolfgang; Kuhn, Arnim.
Hydro-economic river basin models (HERBM) based on mathematical programming are conventionally formulated as explicit ‘aggregate optimization’ problems with a single, aggregate objective function. Often unintended, this format implicitly assumes that decisions on water allocation are made via central planning or functioning markets such as to maximize social welfare. In the absence of perfect water markets, however, individually optimal decisions by water users will differ from the social optimum. Classical aggregate HERBMs cannot simulate that situation and thus might be unable to describe existing institutions governing access to water and produce biased results for alternative ones. We propose a new solution format for HERBMs, based on Mixed...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Hydro-economic river basin model; Mixed complementarity programming; Water institutions; Externalities; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy.
Ano: 2011 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/114272
Imagem não selecionada

Imprime registro no formato completo
How Effective is the Invisible Hand? Agricultural and Food Markets in Central and Eastern Europe AgEcon
Hockmann, Heinrich; Brosig, Stephan; Popp, Jozsef; Wilkin, Jerzy; Juchniewicz, Małgorzta; Milczarek, Dominika; Ferto, Imre; Forgacs, Csaba; Juhasz, Aniko; Kurthy, Gyongyi; Hein, Piret; Hobbs, Jill E.; Nuppenau, Ernst-August; Brümmer, Bernhard; Zorya, Sergiy; Bakucs, Lajos Zoltan; Bojnec, Stefan; Svetlov, Nikolai M.; Hurrelmann, Annette; Maack, Kai; Hanf, Jon Henrich; Glauben, Thomas; Herzfeld, Thomas; Wang, Xiaobing; Balint, Borbala; Lerman, Zvi; Shagaida, Natalya; Benner, Eckhard; Wandel, Jurgen; Nivievskyi, Oleg; Kuhn, Arnim.
Since the seminal work of Adam Smith, markets have been considered an efficient tool for co-ordinating the behaviour of economic agents. The basic characteristic of a market economy is that the complex system of interaction among individuals is not centrally coordinated. Under the assumption of profit and utility maximisation (and a whole set of assumptions about the institutional framework), relative prices and their change over time provide the signals that guide, like an invisible hand, the allocation of resources, i.e., the structure of production and the intensity of input use in the various production processes. They do this by co-ordinating the activities of economic agents, i.e., of resource owners, producers, intermediaries, traders, and...
Tipo: Book Palavras-chave: Agribusiness; Community/Rural/Urban Development; Industrial Organization; International Development; Labor and Human Capital; Land Economics/Use; Political Economy.
Ano: 2005 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/93018
Registros recuperados: 3
Primeira ... 1 ... Última
 

Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuária - Embrapa
Todos os direitos reservados, conforme Lei n° 9.610
Política de Privacidade
Área restrita

Embrapa
Parque Estação Biológica - PqEB s/n°
Brasília, DF - Brasil - CEP 70770-901
Fone: (61) 3448-4433 - Fax: (61) 3448-4890 / 3448-4891 SAC: https://www.embrapa.br/fale-conosco

Valid HTML 4.01 Transitional