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| Levy, Philip I.. |
| This paper provides a rough test of a broad and prominent class of political economy of trade models and finds them wanting. The class features governments with weighted social welfare functions, including the prominent model of Grossman and Helpman. Whether the government is the single domestic player or there are other players involved (as with the lobbies in the Grossman-Helpman case) the government ultimately acts as a unitary player in international dealings. Recent work has shown that such unitary actors care exclusively about terms of trade in international negotiations. This paper pursues the implication that governments choice of trade instruments may offer a better test of the unitary government framework than existing empirical work. We use the... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Trade policy; Lobbying; Tariffs; Political economy; International Relations/Trade; Political Economy; D72; F13. |
| Ano: 2003 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/28526 |
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| Lanjouw, Jean O.; Levy, Philip I.. |
| In this paper we explore the substitutability of formal and informal property rights. We analyze new survey data from Ecuador, where households have both formal and informal claims to urban residential property. The latter come from a variety of sources, including the activity of a local boss, or organizer. We first develop a theory of the ability to sell or rent land in which a distinction is drawn between transferable property rights (e.g., title) and non-transferable claims (e.g., length of residence). We use this theory of transactions to show that the increase in price that follows the granting of title may be an overestimate of the households utility gain. In our empirical work we find that the unconditional effect of granting title is to raise... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Resource /Energy Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 1998 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/28439 |
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