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Imrohoroglu, Ayse; Merlo, Antonio; Rupert, Peter. |
In this paper we consider a general equilibrium model where heterogeneous agents specialize either in legitimate market activities or in criminal activities and majority rule determines the share of income redistributed and the expenditures devoted to the apprehension of criminals. We calibrate our model to the U.S. economy in 1990, and we conduct simulation exercises to evaluate the effectiveness of expenditures on police protection and income redistribution at reducing crime. We find that while expenditures on police protection reduce crime, it is possible for the crime rate to increase with redistribution. We also show that economies that adopt relatively more generous redistribution policies may have either higher or lower crime rates than economies... |
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Political Economy. |
Ano: 1996 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7497 |
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Merlo, Antonio. |
In this paper we structurally estimate a game-theoretic model of government formation in a multiparty parliamentary democracy. We focus on the timing and the terms of government agreements in the context of a multilateral stochastic model of sequential bargaining with complete information (Merlo and Wilson (1194, 1995)) where efficient delays may occur in the unique equilibrium. Besides showing that our model yields a good fit to the data on the duration of negotiations over government formation as well as government durations in postwar Italy, we use our estimates to quantify the advantage to proposing and to conduct policy experiments to evaluate the effects of changes in the bargaining procedure. We show that the gains from proposing tend to be quite... |
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Noncooperative bargaining; Delay; Government formation; Structural estimation; Duration models.; Political Economy; C41; C51; C73; C78; D72. |
Ano: 1996 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7476 |
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