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| Registros recuperados: 75 | |
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| Huang, Rui; Perloff, Jeffrey M.. |
| The infant formula rebate program of the Special Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) requires each state to hold an auction where the low-bidder among the three major manufacturers of infant formula became the sole provider of formula to the state, which issues WIC voucher to low-income WIC participants. Using these WIC vouchers the WIC consumers can get contract brand infant formula for free from participating grocery stores or directly from the state. The WIC agencies then reimburse the retailers for the full retail price of the formula purchased by WIC consumers. Since the rebate program started, the wholesale prices of infant formula have increased markedly. The infant formula industry is highly concentrated, with three firms... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety. |
| Ano: 2007 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/9773 |
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| Perloff, Jeffrey M.; Suslow, Valerie Y.; Seguin, Paul J.. |
| When a new firm enters a market and starts selling a spatially-differentiated product, the prices of existing products may rise due to a better match between consumers and products. Entry may have three unusual effects. First, the new price is above the monopoly price if the two firms collude and may be above the monopoly price even if the firms play Bertrand. Second, the Bertrand and collusive price may be identical. Third, prices, combined profits, and consumer surplus may all rise with entry. Consistent with our theory, the real prices of some anti-ulcer drugs rose as new products entered the market. |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Demand and Price Analysis; Industrial Organization. |
| Ano: 1996 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25104 |
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| Berck, Peter; Perloff, Jeffrey M.. |
| A low-cost foreign firm lowers its initially high price–dumping if necessary– until it drives the higher cost domestic firms out of business, whereupon it raises its price. At no time, however, does the foreign firm predate (price below its marginal cost). Tariffs, quotas, and other policies that mandate a minimum number of domestic firms do not qualitatively change the price path (high price, low price, and limit price). The optimal tariff in this dynamic analysis is lower than the optimal tariff in a static analysis (to allow consumers to take advantage of the low-price period). |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
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| Ano: 1988 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/43663 |
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| Registros recuperados: 75 | |
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