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| Prasertsri, Peerapon; Kilmer, Richard L.. |
| As a result of economies of size, food processors are generally large and few in number. These characteristics put processors at a bargaining advantage over independent farmers. Marketing cooperatives were established to counter the uneven bargaining position of individual farmers. This article investigates the relative bargaining strength of one milk marketing cooperative and several fluid milk processors. The Nash bargaining model can be used to analyze the negotiated price in the Florida fluid milk market which acts like a bilateral monopoly. The milk marketing cooperatives have bargained well with the milk marketing processors. The monthly bargaining strength of the Southeast Dairy Cooperative, Inc. (SDC), exceeds the monthly bargaining strength of the... |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Cooperative; Bargaining; Bilateral monopoly; Dairy; Processors; Agribusiness; Marketing. |
| Ano: 2008 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/45664 |
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| Prasertsri, Peerapon; Kilmer, Richard L.. |
| A milk marketing cooperative (MMC) was created by Florida dairy farmers to link the primary supply of fluid milk with the derived demand of processors in the vertical market. For any given milk supply, the revenue or return to farmers per unit of milk is the average milk price received by the MMC minus the MMC’s transfer cost. An important task for the MMC is to operate the fluid milk hauling system that optimizes the MMC’s milk transfer cost (routing and scheduling cost) subject to farm and plant schedules. The objective of this study is to determine if it is economically feasible to implement a more efficient routing and scheduling of farm-to-plant milk collection by the MMC. |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Cooperatives; Margins; Milk; Routing; Scheduling; Demand and Price Analysis; Productivity Analysis. |
| Ano: 2004 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/59380 |
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