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Registros recuperados: 8
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ECOSYSTEM VALUES AND SURFACE WATER PROTECTION: BASIC RESEARCH ON THE CONTINGENT VALUATION METHOD AgEcon
Messer, Kent D.; Platt, Lara E.; Poe, Gregory L.; Rondeau, Daniel; Schulze, William D.; Vossler, Christian A..
Tipo: Technical Report Palavras-chave: Resource /Energy Economics and Policy.
Ano: 2006 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/121578
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THE DYNAMICS OF REINTRODUCING, SUPPLEMENTING AND CONTROLLING ENDANGERED PREDATOR POPULATIONS AgEcon
Rondeau, Daniel.
A dynamic model is developed to analyze the reintroduction of endangered predators. Non-convexities and the conditions under which reintroduction is sub-optimal are studied. Following reintroduction, costly population control should be initiated before marginal animals impose net costs, providing an economic interpretation to changes in the sign of the shadow price.
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy.
Ano: 1998 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/20812
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ANOMALIES IN VOTING: AN EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS USING A NEW, DEMAND REVEALING (RANDOM PRICE VOTING) MECHANISM AgEcon
Messer, Kent D.; Poe, Gregory L.; Rondeau, Daniel; Schulze, William D.; Vossler, Christian A..
This study investigates the influence of social preferences on voting decisions using a new Random Price Voting Mechanism (RPVM), which is best thought of as a public goods voting extension of the Becker-DeGroot-Marshack mechanism for private goods. In particular, this mechanism is used to investigate experimentally whether voting decisions are affected by the distribution of net benefits associated with a proposed public program. Recent papers have shown that, in additional to selfishness, factors such as inequality aversion, maximin preferences, and efficiency may influence individual decisions. However, the effect of social preferences on voting, the predominant funding mechanism for public goods by legislatures and public referenda, has not been...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Institutional and Behavioral Economics.
Ano: 2006 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/21145
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Social Preferences and Voting: An Exploration Using a Novel Preference Revealing Mechanism AgEcon
Messer, Kent D.; Poe, Gregory L.; Rondeau, Daniel; Schulze, William D.; Vossler, Christian A..
Public referenda are frequently used to determine the provision of public goods. As public programs have distributional consequences, a compelling question is what role if any social preferences have on voting behavior. This paper explores this issue using laboratory experiments wherein voting outcomes lead to a known distribution of net benefits across participants. Preferences are elicited using a novel Random Price Voting Mechanism (RPVM), which is a more parsimonious mechanism than dichotomous choice referenda, but gives consistent results. Results suggest that social preferences, in particular a social efficiency motive, lead to economically meaningful deviations from self-interested voting choices and increase the likelihood that welfare-enhancing...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Institutional and Behavioral Economics; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; C91; C92; D64; D72; H41.
Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/51132
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DEVELOPING A DEMAND REVEALING MARKET CRITERION FOR CONTINGENT VALUATION VALIDITY TESTS AgEcon
Rondeau, Daniel; Poe, Gregory L.; Schulze, William D..
Past research suggests that contingent valuation overstates demand for public goods. These estimates of hypothetical bias are probably invalid since they rely on voluntary contributions mechanisms which fail to reveal demand. An improved mechanism is shown to reveal aggregate demand in controlled experiments. However, individual contributions deviate from induced value. Key Words: contingent valuation, voluntary contributions, provision point, experiments JEL Codes: H41, C92, Q20
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Contingent valuation; Voluntary contributions; Provision point; Experiments; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; H41; C92; Q20.
Ano: 1996 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/6856
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COMPENSATION FOR WILDLIFE DAMAGE: HABITAT CONVERSION, SPECIES PRESERVATION AND LOCAL WELFARE AgEcon
Rondeau, Daniel; Bulte, Erwin H..
We study the environmental and economic consequences of introducing a program to compensate peasants of a small economy for the damage caused by wildlife. We show that the widely held belief that compensation induces wildlife conservation may be erroneous. In a partially open economy, compensation can lower the wildlife stock and result in a net welfare loss for local people. In an open economy, compensation can trigger wildlife extinction and also reduce welfare. The conditions leading to a reduction of the wildlife stock are identified and the implications for current and planned compensation programs are discussed.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Agricultural and Food Policy; Environmental Economics and Policy; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy.
Ano: 2003 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/18158
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VOLUNTARY REVELATION OF THE DEMAND FOR PUBLIC GOODS USING A PROVISION POINT MECHANISM AgEcon
Rondeau, Daniel; Schulze, William D.; Poe, Gregory L..
Revised July 1998
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Public goods; Voluntary contributions; Provision point; Experiments; Information; Group size; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; H41; C92.
Ano: 1997 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7265
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Keep It Down: An Experimental Test of the Truncated k-Double Auction AgEcon
Doyon, Maurice; Rondeau, Daniel; Mbala, Richard.
The introduction of a centralized institution for trading production rights in quota-regulated agricultural sectors can dramatically improve the flow of information among market participants and increase efficiency. On the other hand, prevailing conditions in these small markets can provide sellers with a market advantage, yielding high quota prices that impose important financial costs on quota holders and limit the entry of new producers into the industry. In this paper, we modify the normal allocation rule of the k-double auction (kDA) to counter thin market conditions and to favor buyers who bid low prices. In laboratory experiments, we test the “truncated” kDA (T-kDA) against a regular kDA for its ability to affect buyer and seller behavior and...
Tipo: Journal Article Palavras-chave: K-double auction; Experimental economics; Truncated; Efficiency; Commodity market; Agribusiness; Industrial Organization; Institutional and Behavioral Economics.
Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/90829
Registros recuperados: 8
Primeira ... 1 ... Última
 

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