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| Bar-Shira, Ziv; Finkelshtain, Israel; Simhon, Avi. |
| In this paper, we adapt Burtless and Hausman's (1978) methodology in order to estimate farmer's demand for irrigation water under increasing block-rate tariffs and empirically assess its effect on aggregate demand and inter-farm allocation efficiency. This methodology overcomes the technical challenges raised by increasing block rate pricing and accounts for both observed and unobserved technological heterogeneity among farmers. Employing a micro panel data documenting irrigation levels and prices in 185 Israeli agricultural communities in the period 1992-1997 we estimate water demand elasticity at -0.3 in the short run (the effect of a price change on demand within a year of implementation) and -0.46 in the long run. We also find that, in... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Block-Rate Pricing; Irrigation; C13; Q15; Q28; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/14982 |
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| Feinerman, Eli; Fleischer, Aliza; Simhon, Avi. |
| This study examines the optimal allocation of funds between national and urban parks. Since travel costs to national parks are significantly higher than to urban parks, poor households tend to visit the latter more frequently, whereas rich households favor the former. Therefore, allocating public funds to improving the quality of national parks at the expense of urban parks disproportionately benefits high income households. By developing a theoretical model and implementing it using Israeli data, findings indicate all households, except for the richest decile, prefer that the park authority divert a larger proportion of its budget from national to urban parks. |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Budget allocation; Income distribution; National parks; Urban parks; Public Economics. |
| Ano: 2004 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/31105 |
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| Fishman, Arthur; Finkelshtain, Israel; Simhon, Avi; Yacouel, Nira. |
| We consider the consequences of a shared brand name such as geographical names used to identify high quality products, for the incentives of otherwise autonomous firms to invest in quality. We contend that such collective brand labels improve communication between sellers and consumers, when the scale of production is too small for individual firms to establish reputations on a stand alone basis. This has two opposing effects on member firms’ incentives to invest in quality. On the one hand, it increases investment incentives by increasing the visibility and transparency of individual member firms, which increases the return from investment in quality. On the other hand, it creates an incentive to free ride on the group’s reputation, which can lead to less... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Consumer/Household Economics. |
| Ano: 2008 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/46056 |
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| Gould, Eric D.; Moav, Omer; Simhon, Avi. |
| This paper examines why developed countries are monogamous while rich men throughout history have tended to practice polygyny (multiple wives). Wealth inequality naturally produces multiple wives for rich men in a standard model of the marriage market. This paper argues that the sources of inequality, not just the level of inequality, determine the equilibrium degree of monogamy or polygamy. In particular, when inequality is determined more by disparities in human capital versus non-labor income (such as land, capital, corruption), the outcome is more monogamous. This explains why developed countries, where human capital is the main source of income and inequality, are monogamous while less-developed economies tend to be polygynous. The results are... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Marriage; Monogamy; Polygyny; Human Capital; Inequality; J12; J24; O10; O40; Labor and Human Capital. |
| Ano: 2003 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/14992 |
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| Neeman, Zvika; Paserman, Daniele; Simhon, Avi. |
| We consider a neoclassical growth model with endogenous corruption. Corruption and wealth, which are co-determined in equilibrium, are shown to be negatively correlated. Richer countries tend to be less corrupt, and corrupt economies tend to be poorer. This observation gives rise to the following puzzle: If poorer countries do indeed experience higher levels of corruption, and if indeed as suggested by a number of empirical studies corruption hampers growth, then how did rich countries, who were poor once, become rich? Our answer is simple. In the past, economies were mostly "closed" in the sense that it was difficult to transfer illicit money outside of the economy. In contrast, today's economies are mostly open. In the relatively closed economies... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Corruption; Growth; Openness; International Development; F2; H0; O1; O4. |
| Ano: 2003 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/14977 |
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