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	Provedor de dados AgEcon (3) Autor Thoyer, Sophie (3) Goodhue, Rachael E. (2) Morardet, Sylvie (2) Rausser, Gordon C. (2) Rio, Patrick (2) Simon, Leo K. (2) Hailu, Atakelty (1) Schilizzi, Steven (1) Mais... Palavra-chave Environmental Economics and Policy (3) Bargaining (1) C78 (1) D78 (1) Institutional and Behavioral Economics (1) Negotiations (1) Q25 (1) Resource /Energy Economics and Policy (1) Water (1) Mais... Tipo do documento Conference Paper or Presentation (2) Book (1) Ano 2007 (1) 2005 (1) 2003 (1) País United States (3) Idioma Inglês (3)		Ordenar por:  Relevância Autor Título Ano Registros recuperados: 3 Primeira ... 1 ... Última Assessing the performance of auctions for the allocation of conservation contracts: Theoretical and computational approaches AgEcon Hailu, Atakelty; Schilizzi, Steven; Thoyer, Sophie. There is a growing interest in using auctions for purchasing public goods from private agents. Auctions are being trialed in Australia and elsewhere to allocate conservation contracts. The expectation is that competitive bidding will reduce information rents and increase cost-effectiveness. This paper examines how auctions would perform under different assumptions regarding the rationality of bidders. A theoretical model requires bidders to be rational and use Nash equilibrium strategies, while an agent-based model assumes boundedly rational bidders learning from experience. The study illustrates the synergies between economic theory and agent-based modelling. Our findings provide a cautionary message regarding the performance of conservation auctions. Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy. Ano: 2005 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/19478 Structure and bargaining power in multilateral negotiations: Application to water management policies in France AgEcon Simon, Leo K.; Thoyer, Sophie; Morardet, Sylvie; Goodhue, Rachael E.; Rio, Patrick; Rausser, Gordon C.. Environmental policies are characterized by a growing emphasis on participation, devolution and negotiated decision making. Increasingly, centralized top down decision making systems are being replaced by new forms of local governance. In their strongest versions, these involve delegation of formal authority to local stakeholders who are expected to decide collectively upon the management rules of local common-pool resources. Devolution is particularly important in relation to the allocation and management of scarce water resources. Indeed the French water law of 1992 institutionalised the notion of devolution by requiring that water management rules be negotiated at the river basin level between all stakeholders. Although stakeholder negotiation is... Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Environmental Economics and Policy; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; C78; Q25; D78. Ano: 2003 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/58258 Structure and Power in Multilateral Negotiations: An Application to French Water Policy AgEcon Simon, Leo K.; Goodhue, Rachael E.; Rausser, Gordon C.; Thoyer, Sophie; Morardet, Sylvie; Rio, Patrick. Stakeholder negotiation is an increasingly important policymaking tool. However, relatively little is understood about the relationship between the structure of the negotiating process and the effectiveness with which stakeholders can pursue their individual interests. We apply the Rausser- Simon multilateral bargaining model to a specific negotiation process involving water storage capacity and use in the upper Adour Basin in southwestern France. We focus on a coalition of three stakeholder groups with aligned but distinct interests. In addition to the standard indices of bargaining power—the distribution of political weights (“access”) and players’ utilities if an agreement is not reached, our analysis identifies other less obvious sources of power.... Tipo: Book Palavras-chave: Water; Bargaining; Negotiations; Environmental Economics and Policy; Institutional and Behavioral Economics. Ano: 2007 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/37630 Registros recuperados: 3 Primeira ... 1 ... Última

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