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| Registros recuperados: 19 | |
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| Le Breton, Michel; Makarov, Valery; Savvateev, Alexei; Weber, Shlomo. |
| We consider a model of the “world" with several regions that may create a unified entity or be partitioned into several unions (countries). The regions have distinct preferences over policies chosen in the country to which they belong and equally share the cost of public policies. It is known that stable \political maps" or country partitions, that do not admit a threat of secession by any group of regions, may fail to exist. To rectify this problem, in line with the recent trend for an increased autonomy and various regional arrangements, we consider federal structures, where a region can simultaneously be a part of several unions. We show that, under very general conditions, there always exists a stable federal structure. |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Partitions; Federal Structures; Stability; Cooperative Games; C71; D71; H41. |
| Ano: 2008 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/37519 |
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| Brams, Steven J.; Kilgour, Marc. |
| Assume that players strictly rank each other as coalition partners. We propose a procedure whereby they “fall back” on their preferences, yielding internally compatible, or coherent, majority coalition(s), which we call fallback coalitions. If there is more than one fallback coalition, the players common to them, or kingmakers, determine which fallback coalition will form. The players(s) who are the first to be acceptable to all other members of a fallback coalition are the leader(s) of that coalition. The effects of different preference assumptions—particularly, different kinds of single-peakedness—and of player weights on the number of coherent coalitions, their connectedness, and which players become kingmakers and leaders are investigated. The... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Coalition; Fallback Process; Kingmaker Leader; Cardinally Single-peaked; Ordinally Single-peaked; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; C71; C78; D72. |
| Ano: 2009 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/52337 |
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| Sgobbi, Alessandra; Carraro, Carlo. |
| The objective of this paper is to investigate the usefulness of non-cooperative bargaining theory for the analysis of negotiations on water allocation and management. We explore the impacts of different economic incentives, a stochastic environment and varying individual preferences on players strategies and equilibrium outcomes through numerical simulations of a multilateral, multiple issues, non-cooperative bargaining model of water allocation in the Piave River Basin, in the North East of Italy. Players negotiate in an alternating-offer manner over the sharing of water resources (quantity and quality). Exogenous uncertainty over the size of the negotiated amount of water is introduced to capture the fact that water availability is not known with... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Bargaining; Non-Cooperative Game Theory; Simulation Models; Uncertainty; Environmental Economics and Policy; C61; C71; C78. |
| Ano: 2007 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7446 |
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| Forges, Francoise; Orzach, Ram. |
| In a common value auction in which the information partitions of the bidders are connected, all rings are core-stable. More precisely, the ex ante expected utilities of rings, at the (noncooperative) sophisticated equilibrium proposed by Einy, Haimanko, Orzach and Sela (Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2002), describe a cooperative game, in characteristic function form, in spite of the underlying strategic externalities. A ring is core-stable if the core of this characteristic function is not empty. Furthermore, every ring can implement its sophisticated equilibrium strategy by means of an incentive compatible mechanism. |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Auctions; Bayesian Game; Collusion; Core; Partition Form Game; Characteristic Function; Environmental Economics and Policy; C71; C72; D44. |
| Ano: 2010 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/96668 |
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| Sgobbi, Alessandra; Carraro, Carlo. |
| The relevance of bargaining to everyday life can easily be ascertained, yet the study of any bargaining process is extremely hard, involving a multiplicity of questions and complex issues. The objective of this paper is to provide new insights on some dimensions of the bargaining process asymmetries and uncertainties in particular by using a non-cooperative game theory approach. We develop a computational model which simulates the process of negotiation among more than two players, who bargain over the sharing of more than one pie. Through numerically simulating several multiple issues negotiation games among multiple players, we identify the main features of players optimal strategies and equilibrium agreements. As in most economic situations,... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Bargaining; Non-Cooperative Game Theory; Simulation Models; Uncertainty; Risk and Uncertainty; C61; C71; C78. |
| Ano: 2007 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/8224 |
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| Polanski, Arnold; Lazarova, Emiliya A.. |
| We study dynamic multilateral markets, in which players’ payoffs result from coalitional bargaining. In this setting, we establish payoff uniqueness of the stationary equilibria when players exhibit some degree of impatience. We focus on market games with different player types, and derive under mild conditions an explicit formula for each type’s equilibrium payoff as market frictions vanish. The limit payoff of a type depends in an intuitive way on the supply and the demand for this type in the market, adjusted by the type-specific bargaining power. Our framework may be viewed as an alternative to the Walrasian price-setting mechanism. When we apply this methodology to the analysis of labor markets, we can determine endogenously the equilibrium firm size... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Multilateral Bargaining; Dynamic Markets; Labor Markets; Environmental Economics and Policy; C71; C72; C78; J30; L20. |
| Ano: 2011 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/108255 |
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| Registros recuperados: 19 | |
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