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| Ehmke, Mariah D.; Lusk, Jayson L.; Tyner, Wallace E.. |
| Previous work in experimental economics reveals specific differences in economic behavior, especially reciprocity and free-riding behavior, across cultures. We expand the possible pallet of cross-cultural behavioral differences that may exist. We hypothesize that different kinds of strategic interaction and individual decision-making behaviors differ across locations. The variety of experiments we use allow us to report multidimensional rather than just single dimensional differences in behavior across locations. In order to build a broad Homo Economicus we conducted economic experiments in four dissimilar locations: Hangzhou, China; Niamey, Niger; Grenoble, France; Manhattan, Kansas; and West Lafayette, Indiana. Each subject completed an ultimatum... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Time preference; Risk preference; Voluntary contribution mechanism; Ultimatum bargaining game; Cultural; China; France; Niger; Kansas; Indiana; US; Institutional and Behavioral Economics. |
| Ano: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/19225 |
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