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| Glebe, Thilo W.. |
| This paper analyses how the enlargement of a trade bloc will affect national welfare. We establish a partial equilibrium model of a trade bloc either operating as a monopoly with a competitive fringe or facing a duopolistic game in production taxes/subsidies. Given this framework, we demonstrate how member countries’ welfare effects depend on their trade flow and the market power of the trade bloc. A numerical estimation of the effects of EU enlargement on the major grain crop markets suggests that welfare effects are negligible. Economic reasons are therefore unlikely to be a motivating force for further enlargement. |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Trade bloc; Trade liberalisation; Game theory; European Union; International Relations/Trade; D42; F11; Q17; Q18. |
| Ano: 2009 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/58061 |
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| Brennan, Timothy J.. |
| Allegations of market power in wholesale electricity sales are typically tested using price-cost margins. Such tests are inherently suspect in markets-such as electricity-that are subject to capacity constraints. In such markets, prices can vary with demand while quantity, and thus cost measure, remain fixed. Erroneous conclusions are more likely when the proxy for marginal cost is the average operating cost of the marginal plant. Measured this way, high Lerner indexes are consistent with competitive behavior. Using this proxy to cap wholesale prices, as the U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission has proposed, would discourage entry by making it impossible for peak power suppliers to recover capital costs. The wholesale electricity sector may be... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Market power; Electricity; Peak load pricing; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; D42; L11; L51; L94. |
| Ano: 2002 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10804 |
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| Karp, Larry S.. |
| If a durable good monopolist produces at constant marginal costs and the good depreciates, there exists a family of Strong Markov Perfect Equilibrium (SMPE) with an infinitesimal period of commitment. One member of this family entails instantaneous production of the level of stock produced in a competitive equilibrium; this is consistent with the Coase Conjecture. Other SMPE in the family entail steady state production at a stock level lower than in the competitive equilibrium. In these equilibria, there may be a jump to the steady state, or the steady state may be approached asymptotically. Monopoly profits are positive in these equilibria, and the Coase Conjecture fails. We contrast this result to other papers which use non-Markov strategies to construct... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Coase Conjecture; Depreciation; Multiple Markov Equilibria; Industrial Organization; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; D42; L12; Q39. |
| Ano: 1995 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/6115 |
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| Asad Falsafi Zadeh, Neda; Sabouhi Sabouni, Mahmood. |
| In current study, an irrigation examination and acquisition of environmental water in Kor River fields, that is dominated from Doroudzan dam to Bakhtegan Lake, was done by an integrated economy-environmental model. The model was considered by economic, hydrologic and agronomic components. In the economic component, an optimal harvesting of water was done using non-linear programming in two scenarios; with and without environmental water constraint. Solutions from simulation of environmental data in the hydrologic component, was used as initial data in the economic component. In the agronomic component, actual crop yield in wet, normal and dry years was determined using the relationship between crop yield and irrigation water amount. Results showed that,... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Expected Net Income; Hydrology; Non-Linear Programming Model; Deficit Irrigation; Consumer/Household Economics; Environmental Economics and Policy; Farm Management; Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety; Production Economics; Risk and Uncertainty; C32; C61; D42; D61. |
| Ano: 2009 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/50258 |
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