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| Wilson, William W.; Dahl, Bruce L.; Johnson, D. Demcey. |
| One of the major trade policy problems identified by U.S. interests, including grower groups, traders, and policymakers, is that of pricing transparency. This has been a gnawing issue generally related to the pricing practices of competitor exporting countries with state trading enterprises (STEs). The transparency problem generally refers to the inability to observe rivals' terms of trade (including price, quality, credit, etc.) and is normally associated with commercial exporters competing against STE rivals. The perception being the less transparent competitors (STEs) would have a strategic advantage. A game theory model of bidding competition was developed to simulate the effects of information asymmetry amongst rivals. A Bayes-Nash equilibrium... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Price Transparency; Strategic Bidding; Game Theory; Bayesian-Nash; State Trading Enterprises; Export Enhancement Program; Wheat; International Relations/Trade. |
| Ano: 1999 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/23403 |
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| Haley, Stephen L.. |
| Because increasing yearly U.S. imports of Canadian wheat have been a major concern of U.S. wheat interests, a policy restricting Canadian wheat imports may endure for the next few years. However, within the context of product differentiation, placing a restriction on the importation of a product that resembles one which is produced domestically may not benefit domestic producers of the product or the interests of policymakers. This analysis shows for various criteria under which EEP targets and bonus amounts have been chosen, it is unlikely that a restriction on U.S. wheat imports from Canada will have any beneficial effects. |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Canada; Export Enhancement Program; Wheat; Agricultural and Food Policy; International Relations/Trade. |
| Ano: 1995 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/51217 |
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