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| Gulati, Sumeet; Vercammen, James. |
| In this paper we present the economic determinants of the optimal length of a carbon offset contract. We find that because of a declining capacity of the soil to sequester carbon, the optimal length of the carbon contract is finite (the marginal benefit of remaining in the contract is declining over time, whereas marginal opportunity cost is rising). We also explore the effect of varying key parameter values on the optimal length in the contract. If the contract requires the farmer to sequester at a higher rate, the farmer chooses the contract for a shorter length of time, and this may decrease rather than increase social welfare. If society places a higher value on carbon accumulation, the contract is chosen for a longer length of time. Finally, if both... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Carbon offset contracts; Greenhouse gas policy; Soil carbon; Environmental Economics and Policy; Farm Management; Q200; Q580. |
| Ano: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/37027 |
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| Schneider, Uwe A.; McCarl, Bruce A.. |
| Policies to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions are likely to increase energy prices. Higher energy prices raise farmer costs for diesel and other fuels, irrigation water, farm chemicals, and grain drying. Simultaneously, renewable energy options become more attractive to agricultural producers. We consider both of these impacts, estimating the economic and environmental consequences of higher energy prices on U.S. agriculture. To do this we employ a price-endogenous agricultural sector model and solve that model for a range of carbon-tax-based energy price changes. Our results show mostly positive impacts on net farm income in the intermediate run. Through market price adjustments, fossil fuel costs are largely passed on to consumers. Additional farm... |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Energy tax; Greenhouse gas policy; U.S. agricultural sector; Bioenergy; Mathematical programming; Environmental Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10242 |
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