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| Registros recuperados: 12 | |
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| Parry, Ian W.H.. |
| This paper derives and implements formulas for the welfare effects of differentiated and uniform mileage taxes, gasoline taxes, and per mile insurance premiums, for reducing the external costs of passenger vehicle accidents. The model distinguishes three driver groups and five vehicle groups, and we obtain estimates of external accident costs per mile for each group from crash data. The (average) external accident cost is estimated at 2.2-6.6 cents per mile. Accidents costs differ substantially across drivers of different ages, but only moderately across different vehicles groups. Annual welfare gains from a mileage tax differentiated across drivers and vehicles according to marginal external costs are $9.4 billion in the benchmark case. The uniform... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Traffic accidents; External costs; Pricing policies; Insurance reform; Public Economics; R48; H22; H23. |
| Ano: 2003 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10674 |
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| Lanzi, Elisa; Sue Wing, Ian. |
| This paper argues for introducing the role of capital malleability into the analysis of environmental policies. The issue is explored by means of a theoretical model, a numerical analysis and a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model. Considering the three approaches together is fundamental in obtaining theory-compatible policy-relevant results. The model outcomes reveal differences between results under separate assumptions regarding the malleability of capital. When capital is imperfectly malleable a carbon policy is less effective than under the assumption of perfect malleability of capital. Therefore, it is important that, especially for the analysis of short-term environmental regulations, the issue of capital malleability is taken into... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: General Equilibrium; CGE Models; Climate Change Policy; Environmental Economics and Policy; C68; D58; H22; Q43. |
| Ano: 2010 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/59476 |
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| Walls, Margaret; Hanson, Jean. |
| One of the most common criticisms of pollution taxes is that they are often believed to be inequitable -- i.e., low income households are thought to be disproportionately harmed. In this paper, we assess the distributional impacts of three taxes aimed at reducing emissions from motor vehicles: (i) a tax on total annual emissions, (ii) a tax on emissions rates (in grams per mile), and (iii) a tax on annual miles traveled. We use two alternative measures of economic well-being, annual household income and a constructed measure of lifetime income. We find that all three fees look regressive, both on the basis of annual and lifetime income - though much less so on a lifetime income basis. However, if one of these fees is used to substitute for existing vehicle... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Motor vehicle emissions; Tax incidence; Lifetime income; Political Economy; H22; H23. |
| Ano: 1996 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10895 |
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| Parry, Ian W.H.; Sigman, Hilary; Walls, Margaret; Williams, Roberton C., III. |
| This paper reviews theoretical and empirical literature on the household distribution of the costs and benefits of pollution control policies, and ways of integrating distributional issues into environmental cost-benefit analysis. Most studies find that policy costs fall disproportionately on poorer groups, though this is less pronounced when lifetime income is used, and policies affect prices of inputs used pervasively across the economy. The policy instrument itself is also critical; freely allocated emission permits may hurt the poor the most, as they transfer income to shareholders via scarcity rents created by higher prices, while emissions taxes offer opportunities for progressive revenue recycling. And although low-income households appear to bear a... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Distributional incidence; Emissions taxes; Tradable permits; Environmental benefits; Distributional weights; Environmental Economics and Policy; Q52; Q58; H22. |
| Ano: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10651 |
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| Parry, Ian W.H.. |
| Grandfathered emissions permits redistribute income to wealthy households by creating firm rents that ultimately accrue to shareholders. Consequently, they can be highly regressive, even if the poor do not have large budget shares for polluting goods. Using an analytical model, this paper estimates the burden borne by different income groups when emissions permits are used to control power plant emissions of carbon, SO2, and NOx. We also compare the burden borne by poor households under permits with that under emissions taxes, performance standards, technology mandates, and input taxes. And we show how the social costs of policies differ from efficiency costs when society has aversion to inequality. |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Equity effects; Pollution controls; Emissions permits; Social welfare function; Environmental Economics and Policy; Q28; H22; H23. |
| Ano: 2003 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10523 |
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| Brennan, Timothy J.. |
| Reserve requirements in electricity markets may get each producer to internalize the cost of grid-wide blackouts it might cause if unable to meet consumer demand. Markets for how such capacity might be procured have been studied. Less examined is how the costs of reserve capacity are covered. "Who pays" depends on how requirements are designed. If each producer has to provide peak capacity available to a grid operator at a below-spot price, requirements will increase volatility-that is, the gap between baseload and marginal peak prices. Requirements based on energy sales act as a tax on baseload to subsidize peak, reducing volatility. Finally, if requirements are designed to ensure that extreme-peak energy is available without scarcity rents, baseload... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Capacity requirements; Reserve requirements; Electricity generation; Utility regulation; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; L94; L51; H22. |
| Ano: 2003 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10569 |
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| Berger, Nicholas; Anderson, Kym. |
| Virtually all countries tax the consumption of wine (and other alcoholic beverages). However, the rates of taxation, and the tax instruments used, vary enormously between countries. This paper details for all OECD and some other countries the consumer tax rates as of 1996, showing specific or ad valorem excise or wholesale sales taxes, import tariffs, export subsidies and value-added or goods-and-services taxes. It also aggregates them into an ad valorem consumer tax equivalent (CTE) at various wine price levels (since many are specific taxes and so their CTE varies with the price). T he consumer tax equivalent tends to be lower the greater a country's per capita production of wine, especially for premium wine. Australia and New Zealand are shown to have... |
| Tipo: Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Consumer wine taxation; GST; Excise taxes; Consumer/Household Economics; H21; H22; H23; F13. |
| Ano: 1999 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/123770 |
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| Ravallion, Martin. |
| Macroeconomic adjustment programs often emphasize the need to protect social spending from cuts, and to protect pro-poor spending in particular. But does this happen in practice during fiscal contractions? The paper presents evidence for Argentina. Using aggregate time series data the paper first finds that social spending was not protected historically, although more "pro-poor" social spending was no more vulnerable. Turning next to new data for an externally-financed workfare scheme introduced in response to a macro crisis, the paper finds that this program was far better targeted than other social spending. However, it appears that the program still had to assure that a small but relatively well-protected share of its benefits went to the non-poor. This... |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Fiscal incidence; Social spending; Budget cuts; Argentina; Food Security and Poverty; Public Economics; E62; H22; I38. |
| Ano: 2002 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/44429 |
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| Bovenberg, A. Lans; Goulder, Lawrence H.. |
| The most cost-effective policies for achieving CO2 abatement (e.g., carbon taxes) are considered politically unacceptable because of distributional consequences. This paper explores policies designed to address distributional concerns. Using an intertemporal, numerical general equilibrium model of the United States, we examine how efficiency costs change when CO2 abatement policies include elements that neutralize adverse impacts on energy industries. We find that desirable distributional outcomes can be achieved at relatively low cost in terms of efficiency. Without substantial added cost to the overall economy, the government can implement carbon abatement policies that protect profits and equity values in fossil-fuel industries. The key to this... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Climate policy; Distributional impacts; General equilibrium; Environmental Economics and Policy; H21; H22; L51; D58. |
| Ano: 2000 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10647 |
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| Registros recuperados: 12 | |
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