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	Provedor de dados AgEcon (5) Autor Finus, Michael (2) Rubbelke, Dirk T.G. (2) Eyckmans, Johan (1) Heal, Geoffrey (1) Markandya, Anil (1) McCorriston, Steve (1) Rundshagen, Bianca (1) Sheldon, Ian M. (1) Tarui, Nori (1) Mais... Palavra-chave H87 (5) Environmental Economics and Policy (4) Q54 (3) Impure Public Goods (2) Algorithm for Computations (1) Ancillary Benefits (1) Ancillary Benefits of Climate Policy (1) Border tax adjustments (1) C72 (1) C79 (1) Carbon leakage (1) Climate Policy (1) Climate policy (1) Coalition Formation (1) Conditional Transfers (1) Coordination through Moderator (1) D70 (1) Endogenous Technological Change (1) Game Theory (1) Imperfect competition (1) Mais... Tipo do documento Working or Discussion Paper (4) Conference Paper or Presentation (1) Ano 2011 (1) 2009 (1) 2008 (3) País United States (5) Idioma Inglês (5)		Ordenar por:  Relevância Autor Título Ano Registros recuperados: 5 Primeira ... 1 ... Última Impure Public Technologies and Environmental Policy AgEcon Markandya, Anil; Rubbelke, Dirk T.G.. Analyses of public goods regularly address the case of pure public goods. However, a large number of (international) public goods exhibit characteristics of different degrees of publicness, i.e. they are impure public goods. In our analysis of transfers helping to overcome the inefficient provision of such goods, we therefore apply the Lancastrian characteristics approach. In contrast to the existing literature, we consider the case of a continuum of impure public goods. We employ the example of international conditional transfers targeting to overcome suboptimal low climate protection efforts by influencing the abatement technology choice of countries. Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Impure Public Goods; Lancastrian Characteristics Approach; Conditional Transfers; Ancillary Benefits of Climate Policy; Environmental Economics and Policy; H87; Q54. Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/44226 Climate Policy, Carbon Leakage and Competitiveness: How Might Border Tax Adjustments Help? AgEcon Sheldon, Ian M.; McCorriston, Steve. In this paper, analysis is presented relating to the impact of border tax adjustments for climate policy on the international competitiveness of energy-intensive industries, and the related problem of carbon leakage. While many of the economic and legal issues are not particularly new, climate policy does present some possible twists to the analysis of border tax adjustments when vertically-related markets can be characterized as a successive oligopoly. Specifically, an appropriate border tax adjustment will depend on the incidence of a domestic carbon tax, the nature of competition in upstream and downstream sectors, as well as the basis for assessing the trade neutrality of any border tax adjustment. If trade neutrality is defined in terms of market... Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Climate policy; Carbon leakage; Border tax adjustments; Imperfect competition; Environmental Economics and Policy; International Relations/Trade; H87; Q38. Ano: 2011 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/103207 Coalition Formation and the Ancillary Benefits of Climate Policy AgEcon Finus, Michael; Rubbelke, Dirk T.G.. Several studies found ancillary benefits of environmental policy to be of considerable size. These additional private benefits imply not only higher cooperative but also noncooperative abatement targets. However, beyond these largely undisputed important quantitative effects, there are qualitative and strategic implications associated with ancillary benefits: climate policy is no longer a pure but an impure public good. In this paper, we investigate these implications in a setting of non-cooperative coalition formation. In particular, we address the following questions. 1) Do ancillary benefits increase participation in international environmental agreements? 2) Do ancillary benefits raise the success of these treaties in welfare terms? Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Ancillary Benefits; Climate Policy; Coalition Formation; Game Theory; Impure Public Goods; C72; H87; Q54. Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/42902 Technology Diffusion, Abatement Cost, and Transboundary Pollution AgEcon Heal, Geoffrey; Tarui, Nori. This paper studies countries’ incentives to develop advanced pollution abatement technology when technology may spillover across countries and pollution abatement is a global public good. We are motivated in part by the problem of global warming: a solution to this involves providing a global public good, and will surely require the development and implementation of new technologies. We show that at the Nash equilibrium of a simultaneous-move game with R&D investment and emission abatement, whether the free rider effect prevails and under-investment and excess emissions occur depends on the degree of technology spillovers and the effect of R&D on the marginal abatement costs. There are cases in which, contrary to conventional wisdom, Nash... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: International Environmental Agreement; Pollution Abatement Costs; Endogenous Technological Change; Environmental Economics and Policy; Research and Development/Tech Change/Emerging Technologies; Q50; H87; D70. Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/46653 Simulating a Sequential Coalition Formation Process for the Climate Change Problem: First Come, but Second Served? AgEcon Finus, Michael; Rundshagen, Bianca; Eyckmans, Johan. We analyze stability of self-enforcing climate agreements based on a data set generated by the CLIMNEG world simulation model (CWSM), version 1.2. We consider two new aspects which appear important in actual treaty-making. First, we consider a sequential coalition formation process where players can make proposals which are either accepted or countered by other proposals. Second, we analyze whether a moderator, like an international organization, even without enforcement power, can improve upon globally suboptimal outcomes through coordinating actions by making recommendations that must be Pareto-improving to all parties. We discuss the conceptual difficulties of implementing our algorithm. Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: International Climate Agreements; Sequential Coalition Formation; Coordination through Moderator; Integrated Assessment Model; Algorithm for Computations; Environmental Economics and Policy; C79; H87; Q54. Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/55830 Registros recuperados: 5 Primeira ... 1 ... Última

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