SABIIA - Sistema Aberto e Integrado de Informação em Agricultura (Sabiia)

Under risk of abrupt climate change, the occurrence hazard is added to the social discount rate. As a result, the social discount rate (i) increases and (ii) turns endogenous to the global warming policy. The second effect bears profound policy implications that are magnified by economic growth. In particular, we find that greenhouse gases (GHG) emission should be terminated at a finite time so that the ensuing occurrence risk will vanish in the long run. Due to the public bad nature of the catastrophic risk, the second effect is ignored in a competitive allocation and unregulated economic growth will give rise to excessive emissions. In fact, the GHG emission paths under the optimal and competitive growth regimes lie at the extreme ends of the range of...

Climate change policy in a growing economy under catastrophic risks

Palavras-chave: Abrupt climate change; Hazard rate; Discounting; Economic growth; Emission policy; H23; H41; O13; O40; Q54; Q58.

Ano: 2008

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/37944

Under risk of catastrophic climate change, the occurrence hazard is added to the social discount rate. As a result, the social discount rate (i) increases and (ii) turns endogenous to the global warming policy. The second effect bears profound policy implications that are magnifed by economic growth. In particular, it implies that green- house gases (GHG) emission should gradually be brought to a halt. Due to the public bad nature of the catastrophic risk, the second effect is ignored in a competitive allocation and unregulated economic growth will give rise to excessive emissions. We find that the GHG emission paths under the optimal and competitive growth regimes lie at the extreme ends of the range of feasible emissions. We derive the Pigouvian hazard...

REGULATING ENVIRONMENTAL THREATS

Palavras-chave: Abrupt climate change; Environmental catastrophes; Economic growth; Emission policy; Hazard rate; Environmental Economics and Policy; H23; H41; O13; O40; Q54; Q58.

Ano: 2007

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7132

Environmental consequences of natural resource exploitation often entail threats of future occurrences of detrimental abrupt events rather than (or in addition to) inflicting a damage gradually. The possibility of abrupt occurrence of climate-change related calamities is a case in mind. The uncertainty associated with the realization of these threats and their public-bad nature complicate the determination of optimal economic response. We analyze the regulation of such environmental threats by means of a Pigouvian hazard tax, based on the shadow cost of the hazard-generating activities. A numerical example illustrates possible effects of the proposed regulation scheme.

WELFARE MEASUREMENT UNDER THREATS OF ENVIRONMENTAL CATASTROPHES

Palavras-chave: Environmental events; Emission; Climate change; Regulation; Pigouvian tax; Hazard rate; Uncertainty; Environmental Economics and Policy; H23; H41; O13; Q54; Q58.

Ano: 2006

URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7150

Welfare measures under threats of environmental catastrophes are studied using the "parable" apparatus of Weitzman and Lofgren [22]. The occurrence probability of the catastrophic event is driven (at least partly) by anthropogenic activities such as natural resource exploitation. Without external effects, the green NNP is a genuine welfare measure vis-à-vis a particular parable economy. Often, however, the occurrence hazard constitutes a public bad, treated as an externality by agents who ignore their own contribution to its accumulation. In such cases the green NNP, although accounting for the event hazard rate per se, fails to properly internalize future effects on the hazard rate of current economic activities and as a result overestimates welfare....