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| Registros recuperados: 45 | |
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| Hanna, Susan S; Oregon State University; susan.hanna@oregonstate.edu. |
| Institutions are the mechanisms that integrate the human and ecological spheres. This paper discusses the institutional challenge of integrating salmon (Oncorhynchus spp.) ecosystems and human systems in ways that effectively promote resilience. Salmon recovery in the Columbia River Basin demonstrates the challenge. Despite the comprehensive scope of Basin salmon management, it has a number of problems that illustrate the difficulties of designing institutions for ecosystem and human system resilience. The critical elements of salmon ecosystem management are incentives and transaction costs, and these comprise a large piece of missing institutional infrastructure. Once the focus is placed on incentives and costs, a number of different management strategies... |
| Tipo: Peer-Reviewed Synthesis |
Palavras-chave: Columbia River Basin; Ecosystems; Human systems; Incentives; Institutions; Resilience; Salmon; Transaction costs. |
| Ano: 2008 |
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| Sommerville, Matthew M.; Department of Life Sciences, Imperial College London; m.sommerville06@imperial.ac.uk; Jones, Julia P. G.; School of Environment and Natural Resources, University of Bangor; julia.jones@bangor.ac.uk; Milner-Gulland, E. J.; Department of Life Sciences, Imperial College London; e.j.milner-gulland@imperial.ac.uk. |
| Over the past decade, “Payments for Environmental Services” (PES) have received a great deal of attention as a natural-resource management approach. We propose a revised definition and framework for PES implementation that focuses on the use of positive incentives as the philosophy behind PES and conditionality as the method for influencing behaviors. We note the importance of additionality of PES interventions to justify their value in a wider context. Finally, we highlight the need to understand the local institutional context in terms of the characteristics of buyers, sellers, and their relationship for implementation to be effective. Our framework acts as a platform to begin examining how the variety of options for structuring PES... |
| Tipo: Peer-Reviewed Insight |
Palavras-chave: Additionality; Conditional; Ecosystem services; Environmental management; Incentives; Institutions; Monitoring; Transactions. |
| Ano: 2009 |
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| Coggan, Anthea; Whitten, Stuart M.; Bennett, Jeffrey W.. |
| The lack of appropriate incentives through conventional markets is a major cause of deterioration of biodiversity on private land. In response, governments often intervene through changing the incentives faced by landholders. There are, however, potentially many ways that the incentives to private landholders could encourage improved conservation of native vegetation on private lands. These policies and incentives leverage change in different ways and are suited to differing opportunities and objectives and incur different costs. Our goal in this paper is to provide some guidance to support incentive selection and design decisions. We initially develop a framework for incentive decision, design and implementation. The framework is supported and illustrated... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Biodiversity; Incentives; Private land; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2007 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10397 |
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| Kerr, William A.. |
| There is a major split between developed and developing countries over the protection of the patents in pharmaceuticals in the TRIPS. This dispute is symptomatic of the difficulties of incorporating a non-trade issue into a trade organization. Incentives and threats are examined in the context of the TRIPS. It is concluded that developing countries have no direct incentives to protect intellectual property, that the threat of trade actions is unlikely to induce compliance and that the use of indirect incentives is discredited and will fail to achieve its objective over the long run. Successful protection of intellectual property in developing countries will require a way to provide them with a direct incentive to enforce such protection. |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Enforcement; Incentives; Intellectual property; Knowledge economy; Threats; TRIPS; International Relations/Trade. |
| Ano: 2003 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/23815 |
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| Kerr, William A.. |
| The European Union is attempting to have the protection of geographic indicators strengthened in the WTO. There may be sufficient rents and other benefits available to justify this strategy in the negotiations. To achieve its rent-seeking goals, however, the European Union needs allies at the negotiations. It has been courting developing countries by touting the benefits of geographic indicators for their products. For most products originating in developing countries, the opportunities for rents will first have to be created, a resource-intensive and problematic activity. Further, even if rents can be created in the short run, the forces of competition are likely to erode them. Scarce resources might be better utilized on other development strategies that... |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Developing countries; Geographic indicators; Incentives; Rent seeking; Sustainable development; WTO; International Relations/Trade. |
| Ano: 2006 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/23827 |
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| Whitten, Stuart M.; Coggan, Anthea; Reeson, Andrew; Gorddard, Russell J.. |
| The use of market-based instruments (MBIs) to provide and protect ecosystem services has gained significant attention in Australia. Despite their popularity, MBIs are not appropriate for the provision of all ecosystem services. Rather, MBIs must be carefully designed given the ecosystem service outcomes desired, while meeting the needs of participants. In this paper we detail the importance of a robust theoretical structure to underpin the selection and design of an MBI. In particular, we demonstrate the role of identifying and analysing the nature of the market failures present, and their implications for instrument design. Our conclusions are illustrated using several regional MBI case studies. |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Market failure; Market based instrument; Incentives; Marketing. |
| Ano: 2007 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10441 |
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| Wale, Edilegnaw; Virchow, Detlef. |
| Crop genetic resources are the building blocks of sustainable agricultural development due to their relevance not only as inputs for variety development but also as indigenous crop insurance mechanisms through traditional variety portfolio management. Their continuous survival is, however, threatened by natural and human driven factors. This threat has induced the need for designing conservation measures. Among the in situ and ex situ conservation options available to conserve crop genetic resources, on-farm conservation has recently attracted enormous attention. To make this option operational, placing incentives (that link conservation with utilization) and removal of perverse incentives are believed to be crucial so that landraces of no immediate... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: On-farm conservation; Sorghum genetic resources; Incentives; Poisson regression; Ethiopia; Crop Production/Industries. |
| Ano: 2003 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25882 |
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| Ferraro, Paul J.; Simpson, R. David. |
| Intact ecosystems provide important global services. Many valuable ecosystems are located in low-income countries in which citizens are not in a position to provide global public goods gratis. To address this problem, international conservation and development donors have been making substantial investments in habitat conservation. Among the more common conservation schemes are interventions aimed at encouraging commercial activities that produce ecosystem services as joint products. We argue that it would be more cost-effective to pay for conservation performance directly. We use a simple yet general model to establish three conclusions. First, the overall cost of conservation is least when direct payments are employed. Second, the donor will generally... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Biodiversity; Conservation; Cost-effective; Incentives; Agricultural Finance; H21; Q28. |
| Ano: 2000 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10800 |
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| Jenkins, Robin R.; Martinez, Salvador A.; Palmer, Karen L.; Podolsky, Michael J.. |
| This paper examines the impact of two popular solid waste programs on the percent recycled of several different materials found in the residential solid waste stream. We examine a unique, national, household-level data set containing information on the percent recycled of five different materials: glass bottles, plastic bottles, aluminum, newspaper, and yard waste. We find that access to curbside recycling has a significant and substantial positive effect on the percentage recycled of all five materials and that the level of this effect varies across different materials. The length of the recycling program's life has a significant and positive effect on two of the five materials and a mandatory recycling requirement does not affect any materials. The level... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Solid waste; Recycling; Unit pricing; Incentives; Environmental Economics and Policy; Q28; H31. |
| Ano: 1999 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10798 |
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| Hyytiainen, Kari; Leppanen, J.; Pahkasalo, T.. |
| Rational land use decisions of private landowners are analysed in the framework of Common Agricultural Policy and other public support schemes effective in Finland in 2003. Net present values are computed for a marginal hectare of a typical Finnish farm. Three alternative land uses are considered: traditional cultivation of oats (Avena sativa L.), cultivation of reed canary grass (Phalaris Arundinacea L.) for energy production, and production of Norway spruce (Picea abies [L.] Karst.) timber. Both arable land and forested land are considered as initial states. Experimental data from 38 afforested stands and distance-independent individual-tree stand growth model are used for computing discounted net returns from forestry. Statistics on market prices,... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Common Agricultural Policy; Energy grass; Incentives; Land use; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2008 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/44178 |
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| Simpson, R. David. |
| Placing production units under common ownership is often suggested as a solution to the problem of externalities. This will not always be true when there are decreasing returns to scale. An atomistic industry could be more efficient than a monopoly in some instances. Even when the "optimal" industry configuration would involve a finite number of producers, no two may have appropriate incentives to combine. An omniscient and benign regulator can always assure a more efficient outcome than would result from the combination of private producers. Whether real-world regulators should be called upon, however, is less clear. |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Externalities; Mergers; Returns to scale; Incentives; Land Economics/Use; L23; Q24. |
| Ano: 2001 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10457 |
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| Registros recuperados: 45 | |
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