Sabiia Seb
PortuguêsEspañolEnglish
Embrapa
        Busca avançada

Botão Atualizar


Botão Atualizar

Ordenar por: 

RelevânciaAutorTítuloAnoImprime registros no formato resumido
Registros recuperados: 9
Primeira ... 1 ... Última
Imagem não selecionada

Imprime registro no formato completo
The German Wind Energy Lobby: How to Successfully Promote Costly Technological Change AgEcon
Michaelowa, Axel.
German wind power development is a technological success story but has involved very high subsidies. Germany was a latecomer in wind power but specific political conditions in the late 1980s and early 1990s allowed the implementation of the feed in tariff regime which has characterised Germany ever since. The wind lobby managed to constitute itself at an early stage and to develop stable alliances with farmers and regional policymakers. The concentration of the wind industry in structurally weak regions reinforced these links. With an increased visibility of the subsidies and saturation of onshore sites in the early 2000s, the lobby has been less successful in retaining support. The current attempt to develop offshore projects may suffer from less...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Wind power; Interest groups; Technological change; Political Economy; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; Q420; Q580; Q520.
Ano: 2004 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/26349
Imagem não selecionada

Imprime registro no formato completo
Delay on the Path to the Endangered Species List: Do Costs and Benefits Matter? AgEcon
Ando, Amy Whritenour.
This paper uses duration analysis to evaluate the ability of interest groups to influence the timing of decisions to add species to the endangered species list by exerting pressure on the Fish and Wildlife Service. Using data from 1990 to 1994, it finds that public opposition and support can substantially slow and hasten (respectively) the progress of candidate species through the parts of the listing process most directly under the agency's control. Since the Service is not an atypical agency, similar patterns of public influence on delay may exist in other areas of bureaucratic decision making as well.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Duration analysis; Endangered species; Political economy; Interest groups; Environmental Economics and Policy.
Ano: 1999 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10564
Imagem não selecionada

Imprime registro no formato completo
Economies of Scope in Endangered-Species Protection: Evidence from Interest-Group Behavior AgEcon
Ando, Amy Whritenour.
This paper looks for positive spillovers from the legal protection of one species to the welfare of others, and for evidence of economies of scope in the costs associated with protecting species under the Endangered Species Act. The analyses use data on the intensity of interest-group comment activity in response to proposals to protect new species. The results suggest that these phenomena are significant, strengthening arguments that wildlife-protection policy should be shifted towards species groups or ecosystems. However, the findings are also consistent with diminishing public willingness-to-pay for protected species in a given area, a pattern which also has public-policy implications.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Economies of scope; Endangered species; Political economy; Interest groups; Environmental Economics and Policy.
Ano: 1999 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10903
Imagem não selecionada

Imprime registro no formato completo
Invasive Species Management Through Tariffs: Are Prevention and Protection Synonymous? AgEcon
Ranjan, Ram.
This Paper designs a political economy model of invasive species management in order to explore the effectiveness of tariffs in mitigating the risk of invasion. The revenue interests of the government together with the interests of the lobby group competing with the imported agricultural commodity, that is believed to be the vector of invasive species, are incorporated in a Nash Bargaining game. The government, however, also considers the impact of tariffs on long run risks of invasion and decides optimal tariffs based upon its welfare in the pre and post-invasion scenarios. Along with the size of the lobby group, which is a function of the slope of the demand and supply curves, the weights assigned to the various components in the government welfare...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Invasive species; Political economy; Tariffs; Bargaining; Interest groups; Political Economy; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; H23; Q17; Q58.
Ano: 2004 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/15642
Imagem não selecionada

Imprime registro no formato completo
The World Bank as an International Financial Institution AgEcon
Shams, Rasul.
The World Bank is a prestigious and large international financial institution. Since its foundation it has widened the scope and the size of its activities. One interpretation of what the World Bank is doing is the provision of public goods. If we take this interpretation seriously the comprehensiveness of the Bank's activity suggests that the Bank is assuming more and more the functions of a world government in the making. An alternative interpretation would look at the World Bank as a huge bureaucratic organization, acting on its own behalf. This interpretation can not be endorsed fully by the available information, but only in the sense of bureau-shaping. The Bank itself is proud of being a knowledge bank. But its actual activity is the popularization...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: International lending; Economic development; Public goods; Interest groups; Financial Economics; F33; F34; G21; O1.
Ano: 2004 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/26380
Imagem não selecionada

Imprime registro no formato completo
Do Interest Groups Compete? AgEcon
Ando, Amy Whritenour.
This paper conducts a test of the hypothesis that interest groups compete strategically for influence with a policy-making agency. It adapts econometric methodology from the empirical industrial organization literature that was designed to work with discrete game-theoretic models, and uses data on whether or not supporting and opposing interest groups submitted comments to the Fish and Wildlife Service about each of 173 proposals to add new species to the endangered species list. The results imply that groups do respond to variations in the expected costs and benefits of a listing when deciding whether to pressure the agency. There is no support, however, for the hypothesis that the levels of pressure exerted by the groups emerge from the Nash equilibrium...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Interest groups; Strategic competition; Empirical game theory; Endangered species; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; C25; C72; D72; Q28.
Ano: 1998 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10732
Imagem não selecionada

Imprime registro no formato completo
Political Pressure: An Examination of U.S. Senators’ Actions in Restricting Canadian Softwood Lumber Imports AgEcon
Godwin, Joseph; Zhang, Daowei.
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Interest groups; Lumber industry; Political contributions; U.S.-Canada softwood lumber dispute.; International Relations/Trade.
Ano: 2010 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/60959
Imagem não selecionada

Imprime registro no formato completo
Project Aid or Budget Aid? The Interests of Governments and Financial Institutions AgEcon
Hefeker, Carsten.
The paper compares different aid policy instruments and their effect on the target group. Starting from a situation where interest groups compete for the resources of the government, international financial institutions aim to change the policy outcome. They can either directly support one group or condition their financial help to the government on its policy. Apart from a normative analysis which policy is more adequate to help one group, the paper also asks what happens if the IFI is driven by bureaucratic selfinterest, and whether this distort policies.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Aid policy; Conditionality; International financial institution; Interest groups; D73; F35; O23; Financial Economics; Political Economy.
Ano: 2005 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/26381
Imagem não selecionada

Imprime registro no formato completo
ELEMENTOS PARA A ANÁLISE DAS DEFESAS DE INTERESSES ARTICULADOS AO COMPLEXO AGROINDUSTRIAL DO FUMO AgEcon
Prieb, Rita Pauli; Zanella, Cristine Koehler.
O artigo apresenta as contribuições do Direito, Ciência Política e Agricultura Sociológica para compreender melhor as relações que se estabelecem entre os atores do CAI do fumo e o Estado brasileiro no que concerne à formulação de políticas públicas para o referido setor. Para tanto, num primeiro momento esboça-se o quadro explicativo das articulações de interesses a partir desses aportes interdisciplinares. Posteriormente passa-se ao estudo mais pontual dos atores e articulações de interesse no âmbito do setor fumageiro no Brasil. Tal abordagem permitiu constatar que as análises existentes fornecem bons elementos para a compreensão da articulação de interesses no CAI do fumo, possibilitando a identificação da existência de forte integração de capitais...
Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Grupos de interesse; Complexo Agroindustrial do Fumo; Políticas públicas; Interest groups; Tobacco Agribusiness; Public Policies; Agricultural and Food Policy; Crop Production/Industries.
Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/109562
Registros recuperados: 9
Primeira ... 1 ... Última
 

Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuária - Embrapa
Todos os direitos reservados, conforme Lei n° 9.610
Política de Privacidade
Área restrita

Embrapa
Parque Estação Biológica - PqEB s/n°
Brasília, DF - Brasil - CEP 70770-901
Fone: (61) 3448-4433 - Fax: (61) 3448-4890 / 3448-4891 SAC: https://www.embrapa.br/fale-conosco

Valid HTML 4.01 Transitional