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The Political economy of environmental policy with overlapping generations AgEcon
Karp, Larry S.; Rezai, Amon.
A two-sector OLG model illuminates previously unexamined intergenerational effects of a tax that protects an environmental stock. A traded asset capitalizes the economic returns to future tax-induced environmental improvements, benefiting the current asset owners, the old generation. Absent a transfer, the tax harms the young generation by decreasing their real wage. Future generations benefit from the tax-induced improvement in environmental stock. The principal intergenerational conflict arising from public policy is between generations alive at the time society imposes the policy, not between generations alive at different times. A Pareto-improving policy can be implemented under various political economy settings.
Tipo: Working Paper Palavras-chave: Open-access resource; Two-sector overlapping generations; Resource tax; Generational conflict; Environmental policy; Dynamic bargaining; Markov perfection; Environmental Economics and Policy; E24; H23; Q20; Q52; Q54.
Ano: 2012 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/123718
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PHASING IN AND PHASING OUT PROTECTIONISM WITH COSTLY ADJUSTMENTS OF LABOUR AgEcon
Karp, Larry S.; Paul, Thierry.
We study the dynamics of optimal trade policy in a model with costly inter-sectoral adjustment of labour, where migrants pay less than the marginal social cost of migration. If workers have rational expectations, a future tariff has an announcement effect on the current migration decision. If the government is able to commit itself to future policy, the optimal trajectory involves phasing in and then phasing out protection of the dying sector. This contrasts with recommendations of gradual liberalization. Without the ability to make commitments, the equilibrium policy begins with and maintains free trade.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Adjustment costs; Dynamic tariffs; Time inconsistency; Markov perfection; International Relations/Trade.
Ano: 1993 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/51112
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LABOR ADJUSTMENT AND GRADUAL REFORM: IS COMMITMENT IMPORTANT? AgEcon
Karp, Larry S.; Paul, Thierry.
We analyze a model in which a government uses a second best policy to affect the reallocation of labor, following a change in relative prices. We consider two extreme cases, in which the government has either unlimited or negligible ability to commit to future actions. We explain why the ability to make commitments may be unimportant, and we illustrate this conjecture with numerical examples. For either assumption about commitment ability, the equilibrium policy involves gradual liberalization. The dying sector is protected during the transition to a free market, in order to decrease the amount of unemployment Our results are sensitive to the assumptions about migration.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Adjustment costs; Dynamic tariffs; Time inconsistency; Markov perfection; Labor and Human Capital.
Ano: 1994 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/51222
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Intersectoral Adjustment and Policy Intervention: the Importance of General Equilibrium Effects AgEcon
Karp, Larry S.; Paul, Thierry.
We model adjustment costs in a general equilibrium setting using a "transport sector". This sector provides services needed to re-allocate a factor of production across two other sectors. A market imperfection in the transport sector causes adjustment to occur too slowly in the absence of government intervention. The government has a restricted menu of second best policies to remedy this imperfection. Given this restricted menu, the optimal policy choice depends on the government's ability to make commitments. The key to these results is our replacement of the black box of adjustment costs with an explicit model of these costs.
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Adjustment costs; Dynamic policies; Time-inconsistency; Markov perfection; Disadvantageous policy; Industrial Organization; F13; J20; J24.
Ano: 2002 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/25114
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