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	Provedor de dados AgEcon (4) Autor Gu, Kaiping (1) He, Jixin (1) Hong, Sunghoon (1) Hou, Ning (1) Ilkilic, Rahmi (1) Liu, Na (1) Ylkilic, Rahmi (1) Mais... Palavra-chave Nash Equilibrium (4) C72 (3) D85 (3) C62 (2) Centrality Measures (2) Networks (2) Research Methods/ Statistical Methods (2) Allocation efficiency (1) Carbon emission permits (1) China (1) Cournot Markets (1) Efficiency (1) Environmental Economics and Policy (1) Game theory (1) H56 (1) Institutional and Behavioral Economics (1) Kalai-Zemel Game of Flow (1) L11 (1) Network Interdiction (1) Noncooperative Game of Flow (1) Mais... Tipo do documento Working or Discussion Paper (3) Thesis or Dissertation (1) Ano 2011 (1) 2009 (2) 2008 (1) País United States (4) Idioma Inglês (4)		Ordenar por:  Relevância Autor Título Ano Registros recuperados: 4 Primeira ... 1 ... Última Cournot Competition on a Network of Markets and Firms AgEcon Ilkilic, Rahmi. Suppose markets and firms are connected in a bi-partite network, where firms can only supply to the markets they are connected to. Firms compete a la Cournot and decide how much to supply to each market they have a link with. We assume that markets have linear demand functions and firms have convex quadratic cost functions. We show there exists a unique equilibrium in any given network of firms and markets. We provide a formula which expresses the quantities at an equilibrium as a function of a network centrality measure. Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Cournot Markets; Networks; Nash Equilibrium; Centrality Measures; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; C62; C72; D85; L11. Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/50679 Emission Permits Trade of Carbon Based on the Game Theory of Double Auction AgEcon Liu, Na; He, Jixin; Hou, Ning; Gu, Kaiping. As the world's largest carbon resources country with relatively great carbon emission, China in has just started its carbon trade. China is only a passive participant in international carbon trading market, rarely participating in the project of Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). Therefore, trade market of emission permits can be divided into first and second trade markets. During the definition of emission right, we found out that the ways of emission trade at second carbon trade market is the key to the research on carbon trade, which can realize the allocation efficiency and utilization efficiency of resources. Then, feasibility of implementing auction system of emission permits trade in China is analyzed from the aspects of legal protection, technical... Tipo: Thesis or Dissertation Palavras-chave: Carbon emission permits; Game theory; Nash Equilibrium; Allocation efficiency; China; Research and Development/Tech Change/Emerging Technologies; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; Risk and Uncertainty. Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/56347 Network of Commons AgEcon Ylkilic, Rahmi. A tragedy of the commons appears when the users of a common resource have incentives to exploit it more than the socially efficient level. We analyze the situation when the tragedy of the commons is embedded in a network of users and sources. Users play a game of extractions, where they decide how much resource to draw from each source they are connected to. We show that if the value of the resource to the users is linear, then each resource exhibits an isolated problem. There exists a unique equilibrium. But when the users have concave values, the network structure matters. The exploitation at each source depends on the centrality of the links connecting the source to the users. The equilibrium is unique and we provide a formula which expresses the... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Tragedy of the Commons; Networks; Nash Equilibrium; Efficiency; Centrality Measures; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; C62; C72; D85; Q20. Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/6221 Strategic Network Interdiction AgEcon Hong, Sunghoon. We develop a strategic model of network interdiction in a non-cooperative game of flow. An adversary, endowed with a bounded quantity of bads, chooses a flow specifying a plan for carrying bads through a network from a base to a target. Simultaneously, an agency chooses a blockage specifying a plan for blocking the transport of bads through arcs in the network. The bads carried to the target cause a target loss while the blocked arcs cause a network loss. The adversary earns and the agency loses from both target loss and network loss. The adversary incurs the expense of carrying bads. In this model we study Nash equilibria and find a power law relation between the probability and the extent of the target loss. Our model contributes to the literature of... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Network Interdiction; Noncooperative Game of Flow; Nash Equilibrium; Power Law; Kalai-Zemel Game of Flow; Environmental Economics and Policy; C72; D85; H56. Ano: 2011 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/108252 Registros recuperados: 4 Primeira ... 1 ... Última

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