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| Marette, Stephan; Beghin, John C.. |
| We analyze the effects of a domestic standard that reduces an externality associated with the consumption of the good targeted by the standard, using a model in which foreign and domestic producers compete in the domestic good market. Producers can reduce expected damage associated with the externality by incurring a cost that varies by source of origin. Despite potential protectionism, the standard is useful in correcting the consumption externality in the domestic country. Protectionism occurs when the welfare-maximizing domestic standard is higher than the international standard maximizing welfare inclusive of foreign profits. The standard is actually anti-protectionist when foreign producers are much more efficient at addressing the externality than... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Externality; Nontariff barriers; Protectionism; Safety; Standard; Tariff equivalent; International Relations/Trade. |
| Ano: 2007 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10007 |
