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| Registros recuperados: 19 | |
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| Collentine, Dennis. |
| The composite market design is a proposal for a Transferable Discharge Permit (TDP) system which specifically includes agricultural non-point source (NPS) dischargers and addresses both property rights and transaction cost problems. The first step to implementation of a composite market scheme is the estimation of a supply curve for abatement measures in the catchment area. Estimation is performed by combining costs with modeled loss reductions from selected Best Management Practices (BMPs) and then using this information to estimate the supply curve for abatement which in turn can then be used to set permit prices. The Ronnea catchment in southern Sweden is used as a pilot study area for making this type of estimate. Costs for existing measures that... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Tradable permits; Catchment management; NPS; Environmental Economics and Policy; Q15; Q25. |
| Ano: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/24452 |
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| Newell, Richard G.; Papps, Kerry L.; Sanchirico, James N.. |
| We investigate the applicability of the present-value asset pricing model to fishing quota markets by applying instrumental variable panel data estimation techniques to 15 years of market transactions from New Zealand's individual fishing quota market. In addition to the influence of current fishing rents (as measured by lease prices), we explore the effect of market interest rates, risk, and expected changes in future rents on quota asset prices. Controlling for these other factors, the results support a fairly simple relationship between quota asset and contemporaneous lease prices. Consistent with theoretical expectations, the results indicate that quota asset prices are positively related to declines in interest rates, lower levels of risk, expected... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Tradable permits; Individual transferable fishing quota; Asset pricing; Fisheries; Policy; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; Q22; Q28; D40; L10. |
| Ano: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10639 |
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| Karp, Larry S.. |
| We study a model in which the level of environmental regulation depends on abatement costs, which depend on aggregate levels of investment in abatement capital. Firms are non-strategic. When emissions quotas are not tradable, there are multiple competitive equilibria to the investment problem. Allowing trade in permits leads to a unique socially optimal equilibrium. For a given distribution of investment, allowing trade in permits has an ambiguous effect on the optimal level of regulation. Previous results on coordination games with non-atomic agents are applied to the problem of environmental regulation with endogenous investment in abatement capital. |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Tradable permits; Coordination games; Multiple equilibria; Global games; Environmental Economics and Policy; C79; L51; Q58. |
| Ano: 2006 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7202 |
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| Stavins, Robert N.. |
| Environmental policies typically combine the identification of a goal with some means to achieve that goal. This chapter for the forthcoming Handbook of Environmental Economics focuses exclusively on the second component, the means - the "instruments" - of environmental policy, and considers, in particular, experience around the world with the relatively new breed of economic-incentive or market-based policy instruments. I define these instruments broadly, and consider them within four categories: charge systems; tradable permits; market friction reductions; and government subsidy reductions. Within charge systems, I consider: effluent charges, deposit-refund systems, user charges, insurance premium taxes, sales taxes, administrative charges, and tax... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Market-based policy; Economic incentives; Tradable permits; Emission taxes; Environmental Economics and Policy; Q28. |
| Ano: 2001 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10909 |
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| Parry, Ian W.H.; Sigman, Hilary; Walls, Margaret; Williams, Roberton C., III. |
| This paper reviews theoretical and empirical literature on the household distribution of the costs and benefits of pollution control policies, and ways of integrating distributional issues into environmental cost-benefit analysis. Most studies find that policy costs fall disproportionately on poorer groups, though this is less pronounced when lifetime income is used, and policies affect prices of inputs used pervasively across the economy. The policy instrument itself is also critical; freely allocated emission permits may hurt the poor the most, as they transfer income to shareholders via scarcity rents created by higher prices, while emissions taxes offer opportunities for progressive revenue recycling. And although low-income households appear to bear a... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Distributional incidence; Emissions taxes; Tradable permits; Environmental benefits; Distributional weights; Environmental Economics and Policy; Q52; Q58; H22. |
| Ano: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10651 |
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| Hahn, Robert W.; Stavins, Robert N.. |
| We investigate a central issue in the climate change debate associated with the Kyoto Protocol: the likely performance of international greenhouse gas trading mechanisms. Virtually all design studies and many projections of the costs of meeting the Kyoto targets have assumed that an international trading program can be established that minimizes the costs of meeting overall goals. This conclusion rests on several simplifying assumptions. We focus on one important issue that has received little, if any, attention: the interaction between an international trading regime and a heterogeneous set of domestic greenhouse policy instruments. This is an important issue because the Protocol explicitly provides for domestic sovereignty regarding instrument choice,... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Climate change; Tradable permits; International policy; Environmental Economics and Policy; Q28; Q25. |
| Ano: 1999 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10747 |
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| Sanchirico, James N.; Holland, Daniel S.; Quigley, Kathryn; Fina, Mark. |
| Individual fishery quotas (IFQs) are an increasingly prevalent form of fishery management around the world, with more than 170 species currently managed with IFQs. Yet, because of the difficulties in matching quota holdings with catches, many argue that IFQs are not appropriate for multispecies fisheries. Using on-the-ground-experience with multispecies IFQ fisheries in Iceland, New Zealand, Australia, and Canada, we assess the design and use of catch-quota balancing mechanisms. Our methodology includes a mix of interviews with fishery managers, industry representatives, and brokers, literature review, and data analysis. We find that a combination of incentives and limits on use rates for the mechanisms provide sufficient flexibility to the quota owner... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Natural resources; Created markets; Tradable permits; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; Q22; Q28; D40; L10. |
| Ano: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10543 |
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| Stranlund, John K.; Zhang, Wei. |
| We study the impact of bankruptcy risk on markets for tradable environmental and natural resource permits. We find that firms that risk bankruptcy demand more permits than if they were financially secure. Consequently, bankruptcy risk in a competitive market for tradable property rights causes an inefficient distribution of individual choices among regulated firms. Moreover, the equilibrium distribution of permits is not independent of the initial distribution of permits. In fact, the inefficiency that is associated with bankruptcy risk is mitigated if financially insecure firms are given a larger share of the initial allocation of permits. |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Bankruptcy; Tradable permits; Permit markets; Environmental Economics and Policy; L51; Q28; Q58. |
| Ano: 2007 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7384 |
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| Cramton, Peter; Kerr, Suzi. |
| An auction of carbon permits is the best way to achieve carbon caps set by international negotiation to limit global climate change. To minimize administrative costs, permits would be required at the level of oil refineries, natural gas pipe lines, liquid sellers, and coal processing plants. To maximize liquidity in secondary markets, permits would be fully tradable and bankable. The government would conduct quarterly auctions. A standard ascending-clock auction in which price is gradually raised until there is no excess demand would provide reliable price discovery. An auction is preferred to grandfathering (giving polluters permits in proportion to past pollution), because it allows reduced tax distortions, provides more flexibility in distribution of... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Greenhouse; Climate change; Carbon trading; Auction; Ascending-clock; Tradable permits; Environmental Economics and Policy; Q3; D4. |
| Ano: 1998 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10668 |
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| Liao, Chao-Ning. |
| A mixed-integer non-linear programming model that minimises the total regulatory costs of controlling nitrogen oxide is used to investigate how a newly proposed permit trading scheme in Taiwan, which incorporates the features of banking and a nonone- to-one trading ratio, may affect firms’ emission reduction strategies and permit trading decisions. Compared to the previous regulation where only an air pollution fee is used, the new regulation that requires a reduction in emissions by 10 per cent from the emission level in the year 2000 for a 5 year period will increase the costs by 77 per cent, which is equivalent to US # 9.87 million. The design of banking and the increasing returns to scale characteristic of pollution control among firms might lead to an... |
| Tipo: Article |
Palavras-chave: Air pollution fee; Banking; Mixed-integer non-linear programming; Nitrogen oxide; Tradable permits; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy. |
| Ano: 2007 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/118527 |
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| Stavins, Robert N.. |
| Some eighty years ago, economists first proposed the use of corrective taxes to internalize environmental and other externalities. Fifty years later, the portfolio of potential economic-incentive instruments was expanded to include quantity-based mechanisms--tradable permits. Thus, economic-incentive approaches to environmental protection are clearly not a new policy idea, and over the past two decades, they have held varying degrees of prominence in environmental policy discussions. This paper summarizes U.S. experiences with such market-based policy instruments, including: pollution charges; deposit-refund systems; tradable permits; market barrier reductions; and government subsidy reductions. No particular form of government intervention, no individual... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Market-based instruments; Pigovian taxes; Tradable permits; Deposit-refund systems; Environmental Economics and Policy; Q28. |
| Ano: 1998 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10506 |
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| Registros recuperados: 19 | |
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