Data/hora: 16/06/2024 08:46:37

Provedor de dados: | 31
País: | United States
Título: | Bankruptcy Risk and Imperfectly Enforced Emissions Taxes
Autores: | Stranlund,   John K.; Zhang,   Wei.
Data: | 2008-07-25
Ano: | 2008
Palavras-chave: | Bankruptcy; Emissions Taxes; Limited Liability; Environmental Economics and Policy; Public Economics; Risk and Uncertainty; L51; Q28; Q58.
Resumo: | Under favorable but reasonable conditions, an imperfectly enforced emissions tax produces the efficient allocation of individual emissions control; aggregate emissions are independent of whether enforcement of the tax is sufficient to induce the full compliance of firms, and differences in individual violations are independent of firm-level differences. All of these desirable characteristics disappear when some firms under an emissions tax risk bankruptcy—the allocation of emissions control is inefficient, imperfect enforcement causes higher aggregate emissions, and financially insecure firms choose higher violations.
Tipo: | Working or Discussion Paper
Idioma: | Inglês
Identificador: | http://purl.umn.edu/42127

Relação:

University of Massachusetts, Amherst&gt;Department of Resource Economics&gt;Working Paper Series

Working Paper

2008-3

Formato: | 23