Data/hora: 04/06/2024 04:49:06

Provedor de dados: | 31
País: | United States
Título: | Controlling a Stock Pollutant with Endogenous Abatement Capital and Asymmetric Information
Autores: | Karp,   Larry S.; Zhang,   Jiangfeng.
Data: | 2006-02-06
Ano: | 2002
Palavras-chave: | Pollution control; Investment; Asymmetric information; Rational expectations; Choice of instruments; Environmental Economics and Policy; C61; D8; H21; Q28.
Resumo: | Non-strategic firms with rational expectations make investment and emissions decisions. The investment rule depends on firms' beliefs about future emissions policies. We compare emissions taxes and quotas when the (strategic) regulator and (nonstrategic) firms have asymmetric information about abatement costs, and all agents use Markov Perfect decision rules. Emissions taxes create a secondary distortion at the investment stage, unless a particular condition holds; emissions quotas do not create a secondary distortion. We solve a linear-quadratic model calibrated to represent the problem of controlling greenhouse gasses. The endogeneity of abatement capital favors taxes, and it increases abatement.
Tipo: | Working or Discussion Paper
Idioma: | Inglês

Identificador:

19802

http://purl.umn.edu/25071

Editor: | AgEcon Search

Relação:

University of California, Berkeley&gt;Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics&gt;CUDARE Working Papers

CUDARE Working Paper 928

Formato:

38

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