Data/hora: 16/06/2024 10:40:29

Provedor de dados: | 31
País: | United States
Título: | Optimal Share Contracts under Theft
Autores: | de Janvry,   Alain; Sadoulet,   Elisabeth.
Data: | 2006-02-06
Ano: | 2004
Palavras-chave: | Sharecropping; Cheating; Agrarian contract; Farm Management; Labor and Human Capital; D82; Q15; O17.
Resumo: | Temptation for tenants to under-report output levels under share contracts is undoubtedly high. There is evidence that theft of product occurs and that this affects the design of share contracts. In this case, the optimal output share is chosen to not only induce effort but also to reduce theft of product, while meeting the landlord's limited liability obligation. The tenant's share thus rises with his desire and ability to steal. The optimal contract allows both residual inefficiency in the provision of effort and residual cheating. This contract is also modified by process utility in cheating, ability of the landlord to supervise, risk of revenge with abusive surveillance, and switch to products less prone to theft.
Tipo: | Working or Discussion Paper
Idioma: | Inglês

Identificador:

19801

http://purl.umn.edu/25119

Editor: | AgEcon Search

Relação:

University of California, Berkeley&gt;Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics&gt;CUDARE Working Papers

CUDARE Working Paper 980

Formato:

19

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