Data/hora: 03/06/2024 07:43:51

Provedor de dados: | Research in Agricultural & Applied Economics (AgEcon Searh)
País: | United States
Título: | Repeated Games Played in a Network
Autores: | Kinateder,   Markus.
Data: | 2008-05-06
Ano: | 2008
Palavras-chave: | Repeated Game; Delayed Perfect Monitoring; Network; Communication; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; C72; C73; D85.
Resumo: | Delayed perfect monitoring in an infinitely repeated discounted game is modelled by allocating the players to a connected and undirected network. Players observe their immediate neighbors’ behavior only, but communicate over time the repeated game’s history truthfully throughout the network. The Folk Theorem extends to this setup, although for a range of discount factors strictly below 1, the set of sequential equilibria and the corresponding payoff set may be reduced. A general class of games is analyzed without imposing restrictions on the dimensionality of the payoff space. Due to this and the bilateral communication structure, truthful communication arises endogenously only under additional conditions. The model also produces a network result; namely, the level of cooperation in this setup depends on the network’s diameter, and not on its clustering coefficient as in other models.
Tipo: | Conference Paper or Presentation
Idioma: | Inglês

Identificador:

29923

http://purl.umn.edu/6377

Relação:

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)&gt;Coalition Theory Network Working Papers

CTN Nota di Lavoro

22.2008

Formato: | 36