Data/hora: 16/06/2024 09:09:34

Provedor de dados: | 31
País: | United States
Título: | Limited Cooperation in International Environmental Agreements
Autores: | Karp,   Larry S.; Sacheti,   Sandeep.
Data: | 2008-05-07
Ano: | 1996
Palavras-chave: | Environmental policy; Limited cooperation; International environmental agreements; Strategic complements and substitution; Environmental Economics and Policy; International Relations/Trade; F02; F13; H21; L13; Q28.
Resumo: | Governments' desire to ameliorate environmental problems may conflict with other goals. Policy levels which balance different objectives can be altered by policy changes in other countries. A decrease in the importance of the pollution problem, or an increase in its global extent, increase the likelihood that tighter environmental regulations in one region induce laxer policies elsewhere. The transboundary character and the importance of environmental externalities also affect the amount of cooperation needed to improve members' welfare in a coalition. More global pollution problems require a larger coalition. However, the critical coalition size may be larger or smaller for more severe problems.
Tipo: | Working or Discussion Paper
Idioma: | Inglês

Identificador:

29600

http://purl.umn.edu/6286

Relação:

University of California, Berkeley&gt;Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics&gt;CUDARE Working Papers

CUDARE Working Paper

763Rev

Formato: | 35