Data/hora: 12/06/2024 10:55:20

Provedor de dados: 	31	
País: 	United States	
Título: 	Optimal Contracts for Exploration with Cost Recovery of an Exhaustible Natural Resource Under Asymmetric Information	
Autores: 	Helal,   Uddin; Rahman,   Shaikh Mahfuzur.	
Data: 	2006-09-26	
Ano: 	2006	
Palavras-chave: 	Resource /Energy Economics and Policy.	
Resumo: 	Exploration of an exhaustible resource with cost recovery under asymmetric information about cost is modeled and analyzed employing Principal-Agent theory. Allocation of lower than full information level of effort for the high-cost firms is found socially optimal. However, distortion is less in a two-stage process of exploration and extraction.	
Tipo: 	Working or Discussion Paper	
Idioma: 	Inglês	
Identificador: 	23817

http://purl.umn.edu/28578	
Editor: 	AgEcon Search	
Relação: 	University of Maryland&gt;Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics&gt;Working Papers

Working Paper WP 06-05	
Formato: 	18

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