Data/hora: 12/06/2024 05:06:48

Provedor de dados: 	31	
País: 	United States	
Título: 	CONSISTENCY AND OPTIMALITY IN A DYNAMIC GAME OF POLLUTION CONTROL I: COMPETITION	
Autores: 	Batabyal,   Amitrajeet A.	
Data: 	1998-04-29	
Ano: 	1995	
Palavras-chave: 	Environmental; Regulation; Tax; Dynamic; Game; Environmental Economics and Policy; Q25; H32; D62.	
Resumo: 	I model the interaction between a regulator and polluting firms as a Stackelberg differential game in which the regulator leads. The firms create pollution, which results in a stock externality. I analyze the intertemporal effects of alternate pollution control measures in a competitive industry. The principal issue here concerns the dynamic inconsistency of the optimal solution. Inter alia, I compare the steady state levels of pollution under optimal and under time consistent policies.   Forthcoming in Environmental and Resource Economics	
Tipo: 	Working or Discussion Paper	
Idioma: 	Inglês	
Identificador: 	617

http://purl.umn.edu/28351	
Editor: 	AgEcon Search	
Relação: 	Utah State University&gt;Economics Department&gt;Economics Research Institute, ERI Study Papers

ERI Study Paper 95-29	
Formato: 	29

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