Data/hora: 29/05/2024 06:39:11

Provedor de dados: | Research in Agricultural & Applied Economics (AgEcon Searh)
País: | United States
Título: | Buyer Alliances as Countervailing Power in WIC Infant-Formula Auctions
Autores: | Davis,   David E.
Data: | 2012-05-24
Ano: | 2011
Palavras-chave: | Auctions; Food assistance; Countervailing power; Buyer concentration; Oligopoly; WIC.; Consumer/Household Economics; Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety; Industrial Organization; L13; D43; D44; Q18; I18.
Resumo: | State WIC agencies in infant-formula procurement auctions receive lower bids and final prices when they are in buyer’s alliances than when they are unallied. The Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) uses an auction to procure infant formula. Manufacturers bid on the right to be an agency’s sole supplier by offering a rebate on formula sold through WIC. A theoretical model of rebates shows that bidders may shade their bids and extract surplus from agencies. An empirical estimation shows that bids are lower to alliances suggesting that alliances countervail the power of bidders to extract surplus.
Tipo: | Working Paper
Idioma: | Inglês
Identificador: | http://purl.umn.edu/123863
Relação: | Agricultural and Applied Economics Association&gt;2012 Annual Meeting, August 12-14, 2012, Seattle, Washington
Formato: | 27