Data/hora: 17/06/2024 14:22:02

Provedor de dados: | 31
País: | United States
Título: | A Global Game with Strategic Substitutes and Complements
Autores: | Karp,   Larry S.; Lee,   In Ho; Mason,   Robin.
Data: | 2006-02-06
Ano: | 2003
Palavras-chave: | Global games; Congestion; Coordination problem; International Relations/Trade; C79; D84.
Resumo: | We study a global game in which actions are strategic complements over some region and strategic substitutes over another region. An agent’s payoff depends on a market fundamental and the actions of other agents. If the degree of congestion is sufficiently large, agents’ strategies are non-monotonic in their signal about the market fundamental. In this case, a signal that makes them believe that the market fundamental is more favorable for an action may make them less likely to take the action, because of the risk of overcrowding.
Tipo: | Working or Discussion Paper
Idioma: | Inglês

Identificador:

19770

http://purl.umn.edu/25014

Editor: | AgEcon Search

Relação:

University of California, Berkeley&gt;Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics&gt;CUDARE Working Papers

CUDARE Working Paper 940

Formato:

23

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